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CLIMATE TRANSITION RELIEF: FEDERAL
BUYOUTS FOR UNDERWATER HOMES
STEPHANIE M. STERN†
ABSTRACT
As climate change causes unprecedented dislocation from flooding and
sea-level rise, a new legal regime for climate retreat (i.e., shifting human
settlement from severe climate risk zones) is developing. Buyout laws,
such as FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, fund government
acquisitions of severely flood-impacted homes, enabling owners to
relocate, and require localities to rezone acquired land as open space.
Despite the growing interest in flood buyouts as a tool for climate
change adaptation, there has been little attention by policymakers or
scholars to the capacity of buyouts to incentivize “buy ins” to flood
zones by subsidizing flood risk-taking—a problematic irony given
buyouts’ increasing role in climate retreat. This Article
reconceptualizes buyouts from their current focus on dispossession to
a form of climate transition relief that balances incentive effects against
individual losses. Specifically, this Article advocates for a presumption
against buyouts for flooded homeowners in order to curb incentives for
high-risk housing choices. This reform would carve out a significant
exception for low-income residents of floodplains and means test
buyouts. In the face of severely constrained housing choice,
unaffordable flood insurance, and high marginal costs from property
loss, this group is less vulnerable to incentive distortion from
compensation and more vulnerable to harm from dislocation. While
this Article focuses on flood buyouts, the model of climate transition
relief I propose can inform climate compensation and retreat
policymaking more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
As the climate warms, flooding is uprooting residents from their
homes, threatening towns and cities, and altering ecosystems. Research
applying population growth trends in high-risk areas to sea-level
change projections predicts that 13.1 million people will face
inundation by 2100.1 A recent study by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (“FEMA”) similarly found that flood-prone land
in the U.S. will increase by 40 to 45 percent over the next eighty years
and by 2100 nearly the entirety of several large southern counties will
be underwater.2 South Florida alone could soon see annual flood losses
of over $25 billion, based on the intermediate range of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s model.3 The most recent
research suggests that scientific projections, rather than inflating
damage, have underestimated the speed with which water level rise will
consume residential communities.4 Other mass dislocations, such as the
displacement of three hundred thousand households by urban renewal
programs that redeveloped allegedly blighted structures,5 and even the

1. Mathew E. Hauer, Jason M. Evans & Deepak R. Mishra, Millions Projected To Be at
Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 691
(2016) (using a projection of 1.8 meters of sea-level rise by 2100).
2. AECOM, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100, at ES-7 (2013) (model combining
riverine and coastal flooding); Hauer et al., supra note 1, at 692 (using a projection of 1.8 meters
of sea-level rise by 2100 to predict submergence of Tyrrell, North Carolina; Monroe, Florida; and
Hyde, North Carolina).
3. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ASS’N, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL
RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES 23 (2017) (modeling sea-level rise in Florida by year);
Galen Treuer, Kenneth Broad & Robert Myer, Using Simulations To Forecast Homeowner
Response to Sea Level Rise in South Florida: Will They Stay or Will They Go?, 48 GLOB. ENV’T
CHANGE 108, 108 (2018) (applying NOAA data to estimate costs). Residents of Florida account
for almost 50 percent of at-risk properties from sea-level rise, with southern states together
accounting for nearly 70 percent of the total at-risk population. Hauer et al., supra note 1, at 692.
4. Christopher S. Watson, Neil J. White, John A. Church, Matt A. King, Reed J. Burgette
& Benoit Legresy, Unabated Global Mean Sea-Level Rise over the Satellite Altimeter Era, 5
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 565, 565 (2015); Amanda Ruggeri, Miami’s Fight Against Rising
Seas, BBC (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170403-miamis-fight-againstsea-level-rise [https://perma.cc/XS2V-UNCD].
5. See William J. Collins & Katharine L. Shester, Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in
the United States, 5 AM. ECON. J. 239, 241–42, 265 (2013) (finding that urban renewal imposed
high dislocation costs but also had positive effects on income, property values, and population in
participating cities).
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Great Migration of six million Southern Blacks between 1916 and
1970,6 pale beside the estimated impact of climate change.
Sea-level rise and riverine flooding are already necessitating
“climate retreat,” a budding legal regime for relocating residents in the
most severe flood risk zones to higher ground.7 Voluntary buyout laws
that fund government acquisitions of flooded homes at preflood
market value are poised to become the centerpiece of climate retreat
law, largely due to the dearth of other politically viable options.
Federal buyout laws, the largest of which is the Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program (“HMGP”), compensate homeowners (not renters) for
property value lost to flooding on the condition that they relocate and
the acquired land be permanently dedicated as open space.8 There
have been over 48,000 buyouts to date,9 with a recent government
report noting the benefits of increasing the number of buyouts to one
million.10 Quietly, a regime of transition relief for owners facing
climate-induced dispossession is emerging, one that will shape
residential settlement in climate risk zones.11

6. See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 9–10 (2010) (describing mass migration of Blacks to the north
and west and comparing it to other mass migrations). Notably, one of the factors driving Blacks
from the Mississippi Delta region was displacement caused by the Great Mississippi Flood of
1927. JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND HOW IT
CHANGED AMERICA 417 (1998).
7. Research in this area also uses the term “managed retreat,” which typically refers to a
combination of adaptation measures and relocation of residences and other property “out of
harm’s way.” Leah A. Dundon & Mark Abkowitz, Climate-Induced Managed Retreat in the U.S.:
A Review of the Current Research, 33 CLIMATE RISK MGMT. 1, 2 (2021) (noting that more research
is needed on climate retreat in noncoastal areas). See generally ANNE SIDERS, MANAGED COASTAL
RETREAT: A HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS
(2013) (describing a comprehensive slate of adaptation and retreat tools for climate risk zones).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(b)(2); Helen J.P. Wiley & Carolyn Kousky, Speeding Up Post-Disaster
Housing Buyouts, SOLUTIONS J., Fall 2020, at 59, 59 (noting that HMGP is the largest source of
buyout funding). For other buyout laws, see infra Part I.
9. Elise Gout, Are Buyouts a Viable Tool for Climate Adaptation?, COLUM. CLIMATE SCH.
(June 29, 2021), https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/06/29/are-buyouts-a-viable-tool-for-clim
ate-adaptation [https://perma.cc/QLE3-Z7LX] (noting 48,000 buyouts); see also Katharine J.
Mach & A.R. Siders, Reframing Strategic, Managed Retreat for Transformative Climate
Adaptation, 372 SCIENCE 1294, 1294, 1299 (2021) (noting 45,000 buyouts).
10. Thomas Frank, Removing 1 Million Homes from Flood Zones Could Save $1 Trillion,
SCI. AM. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/removing-1-million-homesfrom-flood-zones-could-save-1-trillion [https://perma.cc/G3CF-VF8R] (citing government report
that buyout of one million homes could save government over $1 trillion).
11. For proposals to expand buyouts, see, for example, Michael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt,
Climate Changes Property: Disasters, Decommodification, and Retreat, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 401
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A fundamental challenge facing climate retreat law is how to
balance remedying individual cases of dispossession against the
imperative to incentivize location choices and residential shifts out of
climate danger zones—and to accomplish this on economically and
racially heterogeneous floodplains. Large-scale residential shifts to
higher ground, not merely one-by-one relocation, are imperative to
manage the predicted scale of residential displacement from rising
water.
Government buyouts of homes create incentives for households
and developers to overinvest in floodplains real estate. Buyouts offer
homeowners de facto insurance against home loss, while imposing no
premiums or equivalent of coinsurance. Thus, dispossession relief and
flood insurance subsidies spread concentrated losses but
simultaneously increase housing density in flood zones and total
dispossession over time.12 Compensation also stymies the capitalization
of climate risk into real estate prices, the potential “invisible hand” of
climate-safe residential settlement.13 Navigating the tradeoffs between
incentive distortion and individual losses is made more complex by
economic and racial heterogeneity, with both extraordinary wealth and
considerable poverty on floodplains.14
Neither the HMGP nor other buyout laws address incentive
distortion, and the burgeoning scholarship on buyouts scarcely
(2020) [hereinafter Pappas & Flatt, Climate Changes Property] (“[F]ederal disaster response
policies should open the door to more buyout possibilities by increasing buyout funding.”); ANNA
WEBER & ROB MOORE, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, GOING UNDER: LONG WAIT TIMES FOR
POST-FLOOD BUYOUTS LEAVE HOMEOWNERS UNDERWATER 4 (2019), https://www.nrdc.org/
sites/default/files/going-under-post-flood-buyouts-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WS6-DCBQ] (proposing
reforms in anticipation of the growing role of buyouts as climate change increases); Eric Tate,
Aaron Strong, Travis Kraus & Haoyi Xiang, Flood Recovery and Property Acquisition in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, 80 NAT. HAZARDS 2055, 2055, 2072–73 (2016) (describing the increasing
prominence of buyouts and their cost-effectiveness); see also Mach & Siders, supra note 9, at 1299
(noting that retreat “offers a valuable set of tools” for climate adaptation).
12. See REBECCA ELLIOTT, UNDERWATER: LOSS, FLOOD INSURANCE, AND THE MORAL
ECONOMY OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 17 (2021) (describing homeowner
lobbying and how Hurricane Katrina created a debt spiral for the NFIP).
13. Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 215 (Knud Haakonssen ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759) (describing an economic theory of the invisible hand where
people acting in their individual self-interest in markets produce societal good).
14. See James R. Elliott, Phylicia Lee Brown & Kevin Loughran, Racial Inequities in the
Federal Buyout of Flood-Prone Homes: A Nationwide Assessment of Environmental Adaptation,
6 SOCIUS 1, 3 (2020) (discussing the racial demographics of floodplain regions); Camilo Sarmiento
& Ted E. Miller, Inequities in Flood Management Protection Outcomes 12–13 (Am. Agric. Econ.
Ass’n Meetings, Selected Paper, 2006) (discussing income differences).
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acknowledges the problem. However, a rich theoretical literature in
law and economics on transition relief predicts these incentive effects
from government compensation.15 In a seminal paper, Louis Kaplow
argued that the government should not extend transition relief, such as
compensation or grandfathering in, to parties harmed by changes in
legal rules because it distorts incentives and produces
overinvestment.16 Government compensation also reduces investors’
motivation to anticipate changes in the law, a point with significant
application to water-level rise and property rights.17 Kaplow contended
that private insurance markets balance the tradeoffs between incentive
distortion and concentrated losses (risk spreading) better than the
government does.18
The scholarship on transition relief raises questions that have been
overlooked in the haste to compensate and relocate flooded owners. In
light of buyouts’ propensity to incentivize risky housing choices, should
the government offer compensation at all? And if so, what factors
should determine whether it offers compensation or subsidies for
climate-induced residential transitions? Most fundamentally, should
we conceptualize the government’s role in climate retreat as providing
compensation for individual dispossession, or as transition relief aimed

15. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 64–73 (1977) (examining the efficiency of grandfathering legal
changes in income tax); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 520–41 (1986) (criticizing the incentive and moral hazard effects produced by
compensation for regulatory changes); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty:
Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811, 821, 823–24
(2009) (describing wasteful races to appropriate resources in anticipation of a grandfathering rule
based on prior use or property rights); Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory
Change and Optimal Transition Relief, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1581, 1615–21 (2011) (exploring the
incentive effects of grandfathering existing major sources of air pollution and advocating pairing
a less stringent standard for pollution from new sources with a more stringent grandfathering
rule).
16. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 527–32 & 530 n.56.
17. See id. at 531 (“It is socially desirable for investors to take into account the prospects for
government reform; compensation eliminates this incentive by insulating investors from an
important element of downside risk.”).
18. See id. at 529. The work of other scholars, most notably Steven Shavell, suggests that
transition relief can be efficient in some circumstances, such as when the individual costs of the
new rule exceed its social benefits and law constrains incentive distortion. See Steven Shavell, On
Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 37–39, 79–80
(2008) (supporting grandfathering an existing rule when a new rule imposes costs greater than its
benefits and pointing out that “present regulated behavior will in principle appropriately reflect
all possible future changes in the world”).
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at encouraging both ex post relocation and ex ante shifts in housing
choice away from flood zones?
In this Article, I propose a model of climate transition relief for
flood buyouts that balances mitigating concentrated resident losses
against incentivizing high-risk housing choice in floodplains. Applying
this model to federal buyout laws, this Article advocates eliminating
buyout compensation when the availability of such compensation
incentivizes people to live in flood zones, as has occurred with highand middle-income households. Instead, this Article proposes means
testing that targets funding to low-income residents, who are driven to
floodplains by the scarcity of affordable housing, rather than subsidies.
In addition, because the goal of climate transition relief is to shift
residents away from flood zones, rather than solely to compensate
owners for asset losses, tenants should be eligible for buyout funding,
and buyouts should prioritize relocation to flood-safe areas.
Of note, while reforming buyout laws is an important aspect of
climate retreat, it is less impactful than comprehensive reform of flood
zone lending, insurance, and zoning.19 The preeminence of buyouts in
climate retreat is largely a consequence of persistent political obstacles
to pricing climate risk into FHA-guaranteed mortgages and federal
flood insurance and to adopting rigorous state and local restrictions on
development in risky areas. Optimally, macroreform to lending,
insurance, and zoning will join buyout law as climate retreat policies.
The climate-transition-relief model for buyouts, specifically its
cynosures of incentive distortion, concentrated losses, and income
differences, can also inform lending, insurance, and other reforms.
This Article unfolds in six parts. Part I describes the emerging
need for climate retreat and the major federal buyout programs,
originating from disaster law, that the government has conscripted to
implement climate retreat. Part II contends that “dispossession bias”
permeates buyout laws, leading us to neglect the incentive effects of
buyout compensation. Troublingly, buyouts promote “buy ins,” or
residential settlement in floodplains, by subsidizing risky decisions to
locate in floodplains—the antithesis of climate retreat.20 Part III
describes the theoretical scholarship on transition relief, considers its
applicability to climate transitions, and introduces a model of climate

19. See J.B. Ruhl & Robin Kundis Craig, 4°C, 106 MINN. L. REV. 102, 168–75 (2021) (proposing
incentives to relocate in climate-safer areas, among other ex ante or preemptive options that limit
the need for climate retreat).
20. See infra Part II.

STERN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

168

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/16/2022 11:53 AM

[Vol. 72:161

transition relief. Applying climate transition relief, Part IV
recommends curtailing buyouts for floodplain residents with the
financial means to opt for flood-safe housing and insure against flood
risk in order to avoid incentivizing residential settlement in floodplains.
Part V proposes a substantial carve-out from the presumption against
transition relief for low-income residents of the floodplains, who face
severe constraints in housing choice and have less access to insurance
markets for risk spreading. Part VI offers thoughts on how to
implement reforms to buyout eligibility, expand transition relief to
include tenants, and promote flood-safe relocation following buyout.
Of note, this Article does not delve deeply into Tribal or intentional
communities, not for lack of importance, but because their differing
concerns and laws necessitate separate analysis.
I. BUYOUT LAWS AS CLIMATE RETREAT
The former radicalness of climate retreat has faded to resignation
as carbon mitigation efforts have failed to arrest global warming and
technology has failed to deliver comprehensive flood control.21 Coastal
armoring via sea walls and beach renourishment with fillers has been
an increasingly expensive, and largely unsuccessful, experiment that
has not retained water long-term and has eroded beaches.22 More
sophisticated adaptation technologies, such as dikes and levees, have
varied, and sometimes unknown, efficacy that differs based on
construction, topography, and water patterns.23 The Army Corps of

21. See Anamaria Bukvic & Graham Owen, Attitudes Toward Relocation Following
Hurricane Sandy: Should We Stay or Should We Go?, 41 DISASTERS 101, 103 (2017); ORRIN H.
PILKEY, LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS & KEITH C. PILKEY, RETREAT FROM A RISING SEA: HARD
CHOICES IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2016) (“Like it or not, we will retreat from most of
the world’s nonurban shorelines in the not very distant future.”). The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change also recognized retreat as a climate response strategy as early as its first report
in 1990. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
RESPONSE STRATEGIES 135 (1990), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ipcc_far_wg
_III_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6WQ-JL3T].
22. See Scott B. Armstrong, Eli D. Lazarus, Patrick W. Limber, Evan B. Goldstein, Curtis
Thorpe & Rhoda C. Ballinger, Indications of a Positive Feedback Between Coastal Development
and Beach Nourishment, 4 EARTH’S FUTURE 626, 633 (2016) (“Beach nourishment does not
change the rate of sea-level rise, the prevailing wave climate, or where hurricanes make
landfall.”); Arlan Brucal & John Lynham, Coastal Armoring and Sinking Property Values: The
Case of Seawalls in California, 23 ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y STUD. 55, 56 (2020) (describing ways
that sea walls increase erosion).
23. See Caroline Wenger, Better Use and Management of Flood Levees: Reducing Flood Risk
in a Changing Climate, 23 ENV’T REV. 240, 242–45 (2015) (describing flood control shortcomings
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Engineers now projects that the massive levee system constructed in
New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, at a cost of over $14 billion,
will fail within the decade.24 Even the most technologically advanced
and extensive dike systems, now being pioneered in the Netherlands,
offer no guarantee of success.25
As flooding from climate change displaces households in the
United States, the federal government is now allocating federal
disaster relief funds to homeowners to compensate them for the loss of
their residences. This Part first describes climate retreat from rising
water, with attention to the socioeconomic and racial demographics of
floodplains. Next, it introduces the major federal buyout laws that
compensate flooded owners for home loss. Last, this Part contends that
the federal government is discreetly retrofitting buyout provisions
from disaster statutes to fund climate retreat. U.S. disaster law, the
source of buyout law and funding, is a problematic frame for climate
retreat because it focuses on disbursing immediate relief for harm,
rather than on incentives for avoiding the harm.
A. Climate Retreat from Floodplains
Climate retreat, meaning relocating households from climate risk
zones to safer areas, is already occurring in the United States and is
projected to affect several million people by 2100.26 Absent discipline
imposed by law or the market, the number of people living in flood
zones in the United States will rise as climate risk climbs. Movement
into flood-prone regions has persisted and increased in coastal areas,
despite copious media coverage and rising public awareness of climaterelated hurricanes and other flood disasters.27 Meanwhile, global

via case studies and suggesting paths toward improvement). Moreover, adaptation technologies
are cost-prohibitive in many areas, certainly at the scale of inundation that will occur. See id. at
243.
24. Thomas Frank, After a 14-Billion Upgrade, New Orleans’ Levees Are Sinking, SCI. AM.
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/after-a-14-billion-upgrade-neworleans-levees-are-sinking [https://perma.cc/J7W8-3EZV] (reporting that water could breach the
levee in as little as four years).
25. See Teake Zuidema, The Dutch Are Building a Barricade Against Climate Change, PBS
(July 10, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wnet/peril-and-promise/2019/07/dutch-barricade-againstclimate-change [https://perma.cc/SQ8A-MEVW] (discussing uncertainty of success of new floodprevention measures in the face of climate-driven sea-level rise).
26. See Hauer et al., supra note 1.
27. A census study analyzing mobility to coastal regions found that between 1960 and 2008
there was a 150 percent increase in the population of coastal counties along the Gulf of Mexico,
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warming continues to raise the sea level more rapidly than originally
predicted and flood riverine areas due to increased precipitation or
avulsions that shift the natural path of rivers.28 Currently, more than
thirty million people, representing nearly 5 percent of the nation’s
population, live in a 100-year floodplain (that is, an area with a 1
percent annual risk of flooding).29 This number doubles for the
combined 500-year floodplain, which encompasses areas with a 0.2
percent or higher annual flood risk.30
Climate retreat seeks to shift human population away from areas
at severe risk from flooding when that risk cannot be managed reliably
or cost-effectively with adaptation measures (e.g., levees, sea walls).31

and the production of coastline housing units outnumbered the national average and the
production in noncoastal counties. Emergency Management Coastal Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Nov. 20, 2021), https://www.census.gov/topics/preparedness/about/coastal-areas.html [https://
perma.cc/MZ2P-EKFP]. In some cases, such as Hurricane Andrew, population increased
substantially even following major flood damage. See id. A satellite study estimating global
exposure to flooding based on 913 large flood events between 2000 and 2018 found that total flood
exposure decreased slightly in the United States, possibly due to outmigration following
Hurricane Katrina. B. Tellman, J.A. Sullivan, C. Kuhn, A.J. Kettner, C.S. Doyle, G.R.
Brakenridge, T.A. Erickson & D.A. Slayback, Satellite Imaging Reveals Increased Proportion of
Population Exposed to Floods, 596 NATURE 80, 81, 83 (2021). However, based on trends, the
researchers forecast that U.S. flood exposure will increase from 2010 to 2030. Id. at 84 fig.4.
28. See Austin J. Chadwick, Michael P. Lamb & Vamsi Ganti, Accelerated River Avulsion
Frequency on Lowland Deltas Due to Sea-Level Rise, 117 PNAS 17,584, 17,589 (2020) (finding
increased avulsion hazards and more inland avulsion-related flooding due to sea-level rise);
Dundon & Abkowitz, supra note 7 (noting that more research is needed on climate retreat in
noncoastal areas).
29. See NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION IN THE U.S. FLOODPLAINS 2 (2017) [hereinafter
NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION]. The 100-year flood refers to the statistical probability of a
specified magnitude of flooding occurring every 100 years, equaling a 1 percent probability of that
level of flood occurring each year. See FEMA, Flood Zones, https://www.fema.gov/glossary/floodzones [https://perma.cc/GK8W-TX87], (last updated July 8, 2020). Prior to the new risk-rating
system, FEMA based its flood-hazard zones on a property’s elevation in a federally created map
called the Flood Insurance Rate Map (“FIRM”). See FEMA, Risk Rating 2.0 Is Equity in Action
2 (Apr. 2021) [hereinafter FEMA, Risk Rating], https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/docume
nts/fema_rr-2.0-equity-action_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GKS-VFFJ] (detailing effect of new riskrating system compared to FIRM).
30. See NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION, supra note 29; FEMA, Flood Zones, supra note
29.
31. See Lorenzo Alfieri, Luc Feyen & Giuliano Di Baldassarre, Increasing Flood Risk Under
Climate Change: A Pan-European Assessment of the Benefits of Four Adaptation Strategies, 136
CLIMATIC CHANGE 507, 519 (2016) (concluding that the projected increase in the frequency and
magnitude of river floods due to climate change makes increasing physical protections against
water such as levees “not sustainable in the long term”). In other cases, adaptation may pass costbenefit review but falter due to the inability of governments to secure the massive funding needed
for major adaptation projects. See, e.g., Brenden Jongman, Effective Adaptation to Rising Flood

STERN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

CLIMATE TRANSITION RELIEF

9/16/2022 11:53 AM

171

In rare cases, climate retreat may mean relocating most or all of a city,
as may occur in Miami in the future.32 More commonly, climate retreat
shrinks residential density and infrastructure in the most impacted
areas, such as direct waterfront areas and the lowest elevations.33 For
example, a 2012 buyout of 1300 homes in New Jersey following
Hurricane Sandy acquired the highest-risk homes across several
communities.34 Targeted retreat of severely flooded portions of
communities reduces risk and the need for disaster relief and flood
services, while preserving most of the locality and the economic
benefits of proximity to water. In the future, it may be possible to
reduce retreat if flood-control technology advances or if we follow the
Netherlands and create dedicated floodplains, construct homes whose
ground floors are dedicated to flood overflow not habitation, and
design floating or “amphibious” homes (homes built to float when
floods occur).35

Risk, 9 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 2 (2018) (noting that effective adaptation to rising flood risk
depends on the “right mix of measures . . . subject to levels of risk, funding, and political will”).
32. See Daniel Cusick, Miami Is the “Most Vulnerable” Coastal City Worldwide, SCI. AM.
(Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/miami-is-the-most-vulnerable-coastalcity-worldwide [https://perma.cc/598E-BG66] (noting that Miami-Dade County will experience
“some of the greatest effects from rising seas” and that “[n]early a half-million Floridians living
less than 3 feet above current high-water levels could experience regular flooding”).
33. Elevating dykes and levees can usefully reduce flood damage, although not reliably and
with significant environmental damage. Research has advocated elevating dykes as a costeffective measure in Europe. See Michalis I. Vousdoukas, Lorenzo Mentaschi, Jochen Hinkel,
Philip J. Ward, Ignazio Mongelli, Juan-Carlos Ciscar & Luc Feyen, Economic Motivation for
Raising Coastal Flood Defenses in Europe, 11 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 1–6 (2020) (finding that “at
least 83% of flood damages in Europe could be avoided by elevating dykes in an economically
efficient way . . . specifically where high value conurbations exist” but “hard protection can affect
the landscape in a negative way, increase erosion, reduce amenity value and result in more
catastrophic events in the case of failure”).
34. FEMA, 3 Years Long, 3 Years Strong: New Jersey’s Successful Approach to Purchasing
Homes Along Sandy’s Flooded Path (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/case-study/3-yearslong-3-years-strong-new-jerseys-successful-approach-purchasing-homes-along
[https://perma.cc/3FBZ-MSST].
35. Sander van Alphen, Room for the River: Innovation, or Tradition? The Case of the
Noordwaard, in ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES FOR WATER HERITAGE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
309, 309 (Carola Hein ed., 2020) (describing the Dutch Room for the River plan for residential
living, which is designed around water flow); Thomas Erdbrink, To Avoid River Flooding, Go
With the Flow, the Dutch Say, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/09/07/world/europe/dutch-rivers-flood-control.html [https://perma.cc/7KYS-JQSQ] (explaining
Dutch floodplain construction); Anna Holligan, Flood-Proof Homes the Dutch Way, BBC (Feb.
21, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-26302176 [https://perma.cc/8YXA-L7Z9]
(explaining Dutch pioneering of floating and amphibious homes).
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Income and racial heterogeneity on the floodplain add significant
complexity and environmental justice concerns to designing legal
regimes for climate retreat.36 The income distribution on the floodplain
appears bimodal, with both affluent owners and low-income residents
occupying flood-prone areas.37 For example, a 2006 study found high
flood losses for households in poverty, low-income households, and
higher-income households, and lower losses for middle-income
households, suggesting an income split.38 As Professor A.R. Siders, a
leading researcher in climate adaptation, observes, U.S. flood zones
“are home to some of the nation’s wealthiest and poorest people.”39
The bifurcation is likely due to upper-income households’ preference
for coastal locations on the one hand, and the comparative affordability
of some (often very high-risk) flood zones and wetlands for lowerincome households on the other.
Overall, low-income residents predominate on the floodplain,
with an NYU study finding that 61 percent of households within the
100-year floodplain lived in a high- or moderate-poverty census tract
from 2011 to 2015.40 Private homes are often more affordable on

36. See, e.g., Dalbyul Lee & Juchul Jung, The Growth of Low-Income Population in
Floodplains: A Case Study of Austin, Texas, 18 KSCE J. CIV. ENG’G 683, 683–84 (2014) (finding
that low-income people are more likely to live in floodplains in Austin than are high-income
people); NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION, supra note 29, at 4 (“In some cases, waterfront areas
may be desirable and expensive, and attract higher-income residents; whereas other floodplain
areas may be less desirable, and thus more affordable for households with lower incomes.”);
Sarmiento & Miller, supra note 14, at 13 (finding that “the poor are more exposed to flood hazards
than middle income households” in a study of twenty communities).
37. See, e.g., MOLLY VOLLMAN MAKRIS & MARY GATTA, GENTRIFICATION DOWN THE
SHORE 2–25 (2021) (providing an ethnographic account of coastal gentrification in New Jersey);
MIA. DOWNTOWN DEV. AUTH., GREATER DOWNTOWN MIAMI DEMOGRAPHICS 12 (2016),
miamidda.com/wp-content/uploads/2016MiamiDDADemographicsReporFinal.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YP9B-HT5P] (reporting greater household income in Greater Downtown Miami, which
is proximate to the ocean, than in City of Miami or Miami-Dade County). For example, Miami,
an epicenter of flood risk, ranked sixth in the Knight Frank ranking of important cities for
ultrahigh-net-worth individuals (i.e., with a net worth of $30 million or more excluding their
primary residence) and second in the Western Hemisphere, after New York City. See KNIGHT
FRANK, T HE WEALTH REPORT: T HE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRIME
PROPERTY AND INVESTMENT 22, 36 (2016), https://content.knightfrank.com/research/83/docume
nts/en/wealth-report-2016-3579.pdf [https://perma.cc/56EX-NK7G].
38. See Sarmiento & Miller, supra note 14, at 13.
39. A.R. Siders, Social Justice Implications of US Managed Retreat Buyout Programs, 152
CLIMATIC CHANGE 239, 240 (2019).
40. See NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION, supra note 29, at 4–5 (defining a moderatepoverty census tract as having a 10–30 percent poverty rate and a high-poverty census tract as an
area where more than 30 percent of the population lives in poverty).
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floodplains, and subsidized public units are disproportionately located
in flood risk zones.41 Absent intervention, the number of low-income
people living in the floodplains will grow over time. Declining real
estate prices in flood zones will attract more low-income households,
who will move into housing sold, or possibly abandoned, by middleincome households.42
There are significant racial disparities as well as economic ones.
The 500-year floodplain has a greater percentage of Latino residents
(25 percent) compared to their national population share (17 percent)
and fewer whites (55 percent in floodplains versus 62 percent
nationally).43 In certain states, such as Arkansas, the percentage of
Black residents on the floodplain is nearly double their share of the
state population.44 There is also evidence that Black residents suffer
higher amounts of flood damage than other racial groups, likely due to
lower elevation and less-resilient housing.45
B. Federal Flood Buyout Law: The Hazard Grant Mitigation
Program
As sea and river levels rise, federal laws that fund buyouts of
individual homes following disasters are now the United States’
primary means of effectuating climate retreat. Federal buyout laws
transfer funds to state or local governments to acquire, or buy out,
41. See NYU FURMAN CTR., HOUSING IN THE U.S. FLOODPLAINS 5 (2017) [hereinafter
NYU FURMAN CTR., HOUSING], https://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_HousingIn
TheFloodplain_May2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFA6-7TSD] (noting that over 8 percent of
subsidized public housing units are in flood risk zones).
42. See Koen de Koning & Tatiana Filatova, Repetitive Floods Intensify Outmigration and
Climate Gentrification in Coastal Cities, 15 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Feb. 18, 2020, at 1, 7 (showing
that with pure market forces, “flood damages and the drop in property values results in a gradual
decrease in incomes of households residing in the flood zone” because poor residents become
entrapped in flood zones and subject to financial losses from flooding and housing prices rise in
safer areas).
43. NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION, supra note 29, at 3.
44. Id. at 4. For example, in Arkansas, 27 percent of residents in the 500-year floodplain
were Black, almost double their share of the state population. Id. However, these patterns reverse
in some states, with far fewer Black residents in floodplains than their percentage statewide in
Maryland, and fewer Asians residing in floodplains in Washington state than their share of the
state population. Id.
45. Sarmiento & Miller, supra note 14, at 13–14. There is also some evidence that women,
due to their higher likelihood of living in poverty, experience more severe social and economic
impacts from flooding. Elaine Enarson & Maureen Fordham, Lines that Divide, Ties that Bind:
Race, Class, and Gender in Women’s Flood Recovery in the US and UK, 15 AUSTL. J. EMERGENCY
MGMT. 43, 47 (2001) (discussing ethnographic research).
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private residential property in floodplains on the condition that the
households relocate and the local government permanently dedicate
the acquired land as undevelopable open space. FEMA buyouts arise
from provisions of the Stafford Act, a disaster relief statute enacted
decades prior to national awareness of climate change.46 Today, these
federal “disaster” buyouts are emerging as a potential centerpiece of
climate retreat, primarily due to the dearth of other politically viable
options.47
Five federal programs offer buyouts for homeowners in hazard
zones, with most of the buyouts emanating from the amended Stafford
Act or disaster provisions within other legislation. Most funding for
buyouts comes from the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
(“HMGP”).48 In addition, a number of states and localities are adding
buyout programs, using funds from stormwater fees and green bonds
to acquire homes.49 This Article focuses on the federal HMGP, but the
analysis of the incentive problems from buyouts also applies to smaller
buyout programs within FEMA and the Department of Housing and
46. 42 U.S.C. § 5170c. The exception to this is from the Flood Mitigation Assistance
(“FMA”) program. See 44 C.F.R. § 78 (2021). The FMA was authorized by the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-446, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
4104c–d). Congress amended the statute in 1994. National Flood Insurance Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-324, §§ 553–554, 108 Stat. 2160, 2270–74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4104c–d).
47. Both public flood insurance and FHA mortgage rules have failed to price in climate
risks. Amendments to the NFIP via the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Act of 2012 attempted
to shift the program away from its current subsidy structure and toward risk-based insurance
pricing. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat.
916 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4004). However, in response to homeowner lobbying,
Congress repealed or delayed (phased in) the key provisions of the Biggert-Waters Act with the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. See Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131).
The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act restored or “grandfathered in” subsidized
rates in a number of circumstances and reduced and phased-in premium increases.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4015(e)(1), (3). With respect to mortgages, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
does not price even extreme climate risk into mortgage eligibility or terms, although it does
require that buyers in floodplains secure flood insurance, as required by the Flood Insurance Act.
As a result, the government guarantees mortgages in severe flood zones with regularity, a fact
that appears to be causing the agency increasing concern. See FHFA, FHFA Listening Session:
Climate and Natural Disaster Risk Management for the Regulated Entities (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Pages/FHFA-Public-Listening-Session-on-Climate-and-NaturalDisaster-Risk-Management-at-the-Regulated-Entities.aspx [https://perma.cc/2P7A-JQZ9].
48. See Kelsey Peterson, Emily Apadula, David Salvesen, Miyuki Hino, Rebecca Kihslinger
& Todd K. BenDor, A Review of Funding Mechanisms for US Floodplain Buyouts, 12
SUSTAINABILITY, Dec. 3, 2020, at 1, 3 (providing a table of common federal buyout funding
mechanisms).
49. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 103F.161; WIS. STAT. § 281.665.
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Urban Development (“HUD”), as well as to emerging state and local
buyout programs.50
The HMGP requires a presidential declaration of a disaster to
release funds for hazard mitigation measures, including buyouts.51 The
statute defines disaster as a natural occurrence that has caused damage
that states and localities cannot rectify without federal financial
assistance.52 To be eligible for a flood buyout under the HMGP, the
land acquired must be within a 100-year floodplain (i.e., a FEMAdesignated “Area of Special Hazard” with a 1 percent or higher annual
risk of flooding).53 The locality must also have adopted a hazard
50. The other FEMA programs that fund residential buyouts are the FMA and the Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (“BRIC”) program (formerly the Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Program), both of which receive annual appropriations. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c(a); Flood
Mitigation Assistance Program, 44 C.F.R. § 78 (2021); FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure
and Communities (Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilientinfrastructure-communities [https://perma.cc/T89K-M6WY]. There are also a growing number of
buyout laws and programs at the state and local level. Manisha Patel & Allie Reilly, Cooperative
Federalism: A Path to Proactive Managed Retreat, 35 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 20, 23–24 (2021); Siders,
supra note 39, at 241. For example, the Minnesota Flood Damage Reduction Grant Assistance
program funds buyouts and other mitigation projects at a 50/50 cost share with the local or federal
government, and the Wisconsin Municipal Flood Control Program offers grants funded through
state general-obligation-bond revenue with a 50 percent match from the local government.
Peterson et al., supra note 48, at 8–9. At the local level, seventeen localities to date have begun to
fund buyouts, either in their entirety or by providing the 25 percent match required for FEMA
funds by using stormwater utility fees, local-option sales taxes, and municipal and green bonds.
Id. at 9–12.
51. “The President may contribute up to 75 percent of the cost of hazard mitigation
measures which the President has determined are cost effective and which substantially reduce
the risk of, or increase resilience to, future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area affected
by a major disaster.” 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
52. Of note, presidentially declared disasters are increasingly common, with ninety-seven in
2011 for example. See BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42702, STAFFORD ACT
DECLARATIONS 1953-2016: TRENDS, ANALYSES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2017).
In addition, disaster declarations extend to flooded areas with no immediate threat to safety but
significant property damage. See FEMA, Flood Mitigation Assistance FY 2020 Subapplication
Status (2021) https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/floods/fy2020-subapplication-status
[https://perma.cc/GM3T-TUJ4] (noting that FMA dedicated $87 million to acquiring properties
and paying relocation costs in 2020).
53. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2022) (imposing 100-year floodplain requirement on the three buyout
programs administered by FEMA, including the HMGP). The FMA receives funding under the
National Flood Insurance statute and deploys funds to state, local, and Tribal governments to
acquire properties, in particular repetitive-loss and severe-repetitive-loss properties with past
insurance claims for flood damage. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c; 44 C.F.R. § 78 (2021). BRIC is part of the
Stafford Act and had an annual budget of $1 billion in 2021. FEMA, Building Resilient
Infrastructure and Communities FY 2021 Subapplication and Round 1 Selection Status,
https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-infrastructure-communities/after-appl
y/fy-2021-subapplication-status [https://perma.cc/C9ZR-NG4W], (last updated July 29, 2022).
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mitigation plan to qualify for funding and formally participate in the
National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), which requires planning
processes to mitigate flood hazards, strict limits on construction in
floodways (i.e., construction or infill in watercourses or on their banks),
and elevation of new construction in floodplains.54
States and localities initiate buyouts by application to FEMA,
typically following major storm flooding when Congress appropriates
disaster funds. The houses selected for buyout by the locality must
satisfy cost-benefit analysis, which requires that the anticipated flood
damage to the home and the ecosystem services (e.g., better
stormwater management, improved water quality, and recreation in
the newly created open space) exceed the costs of acquisition and
demolition.55 The HMGP and other FEMA buyout programs provide
a maximum of 75 percent funding and require a 25 percent cost share
from the state, locality, or homeowner.56 States and localities
sometimes garner additional federal funds from HUD communitydevelopment block grants to pay all or part of the 25 percent cost
share.57
Once the cost share is met and funds obtained, state and local
agencies implement the buyouts. This is an intensive, multiyear
process, with studies reporting an average of five years from a flood to
the completion of a buyout.58 The locality or the state implementing
the buyout must inform residents of the opportunity for acquisition,
provide required opportunities for public participation, appraise the
property and negotiate price, and transfer title. In some cases,
homeowners have sought buyout relief, sometimes for years, and are

Unlike the other FEMA buyout programs, BRIC funding targets the prevention of future
disasters and increasing community resilience to natural hazards. See FEMA, Building Resilient
Infrastructure and Communities, supra note 50.
54. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 201, 206 (2022).
55. See, e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5) (2022).
56. BRIC buyout funds provide a cost share of up to 75 percent, with special provision for
up to 90 percent cost sharing for economically disadvantaged localities with under 3000 residents.
42 U.S.C. § 5133(a), (h)(1). There is no cost-share provision for Community Development Block
Grants (“CDBG”) and Community Development Block Grants-Disaster Relief (“CDBG-DR”).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
58. See WEBER & MOORE, supra note 11 (finding an average time of five years between
flood and buyout); Katharine J. Mach, Caroline M. Kraan, Miyuki Hino, A.R. Siders, Erica M.
Johnston & Christopher B. Field, Managed Retreat Through Voluntary Buyouts of Flood-Prone
Properties, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 5 (2019) (finding an average time of 5.7 years between disaster
and buyout-project closing).

STERN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/16/2022 11:53 AM

CLIMATE TRANSITION RELIEF

177

receptive to acquisition.59 Other attempted buyouts have led to
protests, sometimes based on concerns about discriminatory selection
of minority communities for climate retreat.60 After acquisition, the
statute requires that the state or locality permanently dedicate the land
as open space or for wetlands management.
Notably, while buyouts are the government’s tool of choice for
climate retreat, they are not the most effective way to shift population
away from flood zones.61 Mortgage and insurance pricing, as well as
stricter prohibitions on development in floodplains, have broader
reach and can prevent movement into flood-prone areas, instead of
compensating for flood damage after the fact. However, there are
enormous political impediments to reforms that price climate risk into
housing or prohibit real estate development, including political
controversy over climate change and strong public resistance to
government action that limits homeownership access and choice.62
C. The Uneasy Retrofit of Disaster Law to Climate Retreat
Buyout laws, such as the HMGP, that originate from decades-old
disaster laws focused on emergency relief and rebuilding are a
problematic fit for climate retreat. These laws have been conscripted
into climate retreat rather than designed for it. Congress and the
federal agencies have tacitly retrofitted disaster buyout provisions
legislated almost fifty years ago for isolated catastrophic events into a
rough-and-ready climate retreat policy.63 The HMGP buyout program
originates from the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act of 1974, which disburses emergency appropriations to states and

59. ROBERT FREUDENBERG, ELLIS CALVIN, LAURA TOLKOFF & DARE BREWLEY, BUYIN FOR BUYOUTS: THE CASE FOR MANAGED RETREAT FROM FLOOD ZONES 28–29 (2016)
(describing a New York coastal neighborhood that organized to lobby for a buyout from the
state).
60. See infra notes 255–256.
61. See generally Ruhl & Craig, supra note 19 (advocating a more fundamental policy
reorientation toward climate change).
62. For more detail on the political dynamics that have elevated buyouts in climate retreat
policy, see infra Part I.C.
63. In its 2015 Guidance, FEMA explicitly recognized the role of hazard mitigation grants
in promoting adaptation to climate change and suggested a natural connection between the
concepts of resilience and hazard mitigation. See FEMA, HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE
GUIDANCE 2 (2015) [hereinafter FEMA, GUIDANCE] (“The concept of resilience is closely
related to the concept of hazard mitigation, which reduces or eliminates potential losses by
breaking the cycle of damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage.”).
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localities in the wake of disasters.64 Another buyout law, the FEMA
Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (“BRIC”)
program, arises under an amendment to the Stafford Act, and HUD’s
major buyout program, the Community Development Block GrantDisaster Relief (“CDBG-DR”) program, is subject to some of the
requirements of the Stafford Act.65
Retrofitting disaster programs offers an existing framework of law
and a politically discreet means to address exigent relocation needs.
Disaster law and climate retreat also share certain goals and expertise
that enable disaster law to function as a partial substitute for climate
retreat policy. Both seek to provide relief and minimize loss of life and
property from hazardous occurrences and events.66 FEMA has long
focused on disaster preparedness and has a growing emphasis on
funding risk mitigation via flood-control technologies, natural buffers,
and elevation of buildings and infrastructure.67 In its 2015 Guidance,
FEMA suggested a natural connection between hazard mitigation
grants and increasing resilience to climate change, noting that “[t]he
concept of resilience is closely related to the concept of hazard

64. FEMA also promulgated the BRIC program pursuant to the Disaster Recovery Reform
Act of 2018. See FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities, supra note 50. The
CDBG-DR program arises under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974 but is specifically reserved for disaster recovery. 42 U.S.C. § 5306(c); HUD, Community
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/
comm_planning/cdbg-dr [https://perma.cc/W8P8-USX3], (last updated July 15, 2022). Only the
FMA program is not specific to disasters and instead arises under the National Flood Insurance
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c.
65. Section 1234 of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, which amended the Stafford Act,
addresses predisaster hazard mitigation, including by creating a funding set-aside for predisaster
mitigation measures. 42 U.S.C. § 5133(b). The CDBG-DR arises from Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act but is subject to the Stafford Act’s prohibitions against duplication
of disaster benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155 (prohibiting persons, businesses, and other entities from
obtaining disaster relief when they have already received financial assistance from another
program, insurance, or any other source).
66. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Catastrophic Risk, Climate Change, and Disaster Law, 16 ASIA
PAC. J. ENV’T L. 38, 38–48 (2013) (examining interaction between disaster law frameworks and
climate change).
67. See FEMA, National Preparedness, https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/
national-preparedness [https://perma.cc/T76M-JRES]; NATURE CONSERVANCY, PROMOTING
NATURE-BASED HAZARD MITIGATION THROUGH FEMA MITIGATION GRANTS 3, 5–9 (2020),
https://www.nature.org/content/dam/tnc/nature/en/documents/Promoting-Nature-Based-HazardMitigation-Through-FEMA-Mitigation-Grants-05-10-2021-LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TLPMZMF].
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mitigation, which reduces or eliminates potential losses by breaking the
cycle of damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage.”68
There are also fiscal and political advantages to housing climate
retreat funding within disaster law. Major floods trigger large
congressional appropriations, as well as public support for government
spending to assist disaster victims.69 Importantly, funding climate
retreat via programs that administer multiple forms of relief, including
funds for rebuilding in place, reduces the political visibility of climate
retreat. Government programs for residential relocation, even
voluntary relocation, are politically incendiary, and agencies are
undoubtedly leery of titling programs as “climate retreat.”70 Also, for
some presidential administrations, explicitly acknowledging climate
change and its growing impacts is taboo.71
Despite its capacity for retrofitting, disaster law is far from the
optimal frame for climate retreat. Climate retreat seeks to shift people
and infrastructure out of harm’s way, while disaster law has historically
funded state and local recovery from disasters by rebuilding in place,
and largely continues to do so today.72 The major disaster provisions of
the Stafford Act and Disaster Recovery Reform Act, the statutory
home of most federal buyout programs, redress individual and
community harms from disaster through financial assistance and
rebuilding.73 FEMA’s National Planning Framework for Disaster

68. FEMA, GUIDANCE, supra note 63.
69. Disaster experts refer to the immediate postdisaster period as a window of opportunity
for changing legal rules and policies. See, e.g., Joern Birkmann, Philip Buckle, Jill Jaeger, Mark
Pelling, Neysa J. Setiadi, Matthias Garschagen, Nishara Fernando & Jürgen Kropp, Extreme
Events and Disasters: A Window of Opportunity for Change? Analysis of Organizational,
Institutional, and Political Changes, Formal and Informal Responses After Mega-Disasters, 55
NAT. HAZARDS 637, 637–42 (2010).
70. The highly controversial nature of government-sponsored loss of residences is a major
impediment to crafting comprehensive climate retreat policy.
71. See, e.g., Scott Waldman, Trump Officials Deleting Mentions of ‘Climate Change’ from
U.S.
Geological Survey Press Releases, SCIENCE (July 8, 2019), https://www.science.org/news/2019/07/
trump-officials-deleting-mentions-climate-change-us-geological-survey-press-releases [https://
perma.cc/R7F9-NE7A].
72. See Carolyn Kousky, Managing Shoreline Retreat: A US Perspective, 124 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 9, 15 (2014).
73. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170a–c, 5172; see also FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program,
https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/hazard-mitigation [https://perma.cc/4TJP-TZYN] (stating
that the program’s goal is to provide funding and support so that jurisdictions can “rebuild in a
way that reduces, or mitigates, future disaster losses in their communities”).
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emphasizes disaster preparedness rather than avoidance.74 Notably,
with the Disaster Recovery Reform Act and shifts in agency funding
priorities, both Congress and FEMA are signaling growing interest in
disaster avoidance and risk mitigation.75 However, these projects,
including those funded under the new BRIC program, often mitigate
risks in place so that residents can remain.76
Disaster law also pays uneven attention to the potential incentive
effects from disaster relief.77 For example, most disaster relief requires
a state or local contribution, or cost share, in order to put “skin in the
game” and increase costs for states and localities who permit
development in flood zones.78 However, in some cases the state or
locality does not pay a substantial cost share because another federal
agency, usually HUD, contributes the 25 percent required state/local
cost share.79
The limited attention to incentives in disaster buyouts made more
sense when natural disasters were lower frequency events and it was

74. There is a section on prevention, but it addresses terrorism only. See FEMA, National
Planning Frameworks, https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/
frameworks [https://perma.cc/W6WX-T3W9] (including frameworks for prevention, protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery); FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan, https://www.fema.gov/about/
mission [https://perma.cc/TP4L-DNT7] (stating FEMA’s mission is “helping people before,
during, and after disasters”).
75. The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 and FEMA’s expansion of the former PreDisaster Mitigation Program into the better-funded Building Resilient Communities Program
suggest disaster law is increasingly aware of the importance of prevention and the pitfalls of a
primary governmental focus on response. Pub. L. No. 115-254, Div. D, 132 Stat. 3438 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121, 5122, 5161a, 5174a, 5174b, 5189h, 5196g, 5205a
and amending §§ 3149, 5122, 5133, 5149, 5152, 5155, 5165, 5165b, 5170a-c, 5172, 5174, 5187, 5189a,
5189f, 5205); FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities, supra note 50.
76. See FEMA, Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities, supra note 50 (noting
FEMA supports local communities’ mitigation efforts to reduce natural disaster risk).
77. While there is increasing government interest in risk mitigation, disaster law and most
federal buyout laws on the whole have neglected how federal disaster funds affect local and
individual incentives for climate risk-taking. One exception is the Flood Mitigation Assistance
buyout program, a small program that operates under the NFIP rather than a disaster statute and
requires that acquired homes have flood insurance when the locality submits the application for
buyout funds. 44 C.F.R. § 78.12(a) (2022).
78. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (stating that the president may only contribute up to 75
percent of hazard mitigation costs). This should reduce moral hazard behavior, meaning the
tendency to increase risk-taking when the costs of such behavior are borne by another. John M.
Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 (1976).
79. See Wiley & Kousky, supra note 8, at 63 (describing use of HUD funds and variation in
state approaches to cover the local cost share and advocating Congress waive the cost-share
requirement altogether).
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difficult to predict their timing or, in some cases, location.80 Today,
climate change, with its predictable sea- and river-level rise, and
technological advances in measuring flood risk and forecasting storms
have increased the foreseeability of flooding.81 As a result, there is a
more substantial role for government disaster policy to play in
structuring incentives for avoidance and retreat.
In summary, climate retreat from severe flood areas has moved
from academic debate to reality, through the vehicle of federal buyout
programs. The disaster frame of buyout laws is politically and
administratively expedient, but a suboptimal policy fit for climate
retreat’s goals. The next Part delves more deeply into how federal
buyout laws, in part because of their disaster law origins, focus on
dispossession relief and not only neglect incentives for risky housing,
but create them.
II. DISPOSSESSION VERSUS EFFICIENCY: WHEN BUYOUTS
INCREASE BUY-IN
Climate retreat confronts the dual goals of remedying individuals’
climate-induced dispossession and incentivizing population shifts to
higher ground. Buyout laws vacillate between these two goals but place
more emphasis on providing dispossession relief for owners. Although
the HMGP’s stated purpose is to mitigate hazard risk and increase
community resilience,82 its legal structure and individual provisions
prioritize making homeowners as whole as possible—and in doing so,
create incentives for residential settlement in floodplains. Buyouts
offer homeowners generous compensation, often at preflood fair
market value, ultimately subsidizing private risk-taking in housing with
public funds. Moreover, buyouts do not necessarily aid the neediest
and are economically regressive in multiple respects.

80. Cf. Carolyn Kousky, Howard Kunruether, Michael LaCour-Little & Susan Wachter,
Flood Risk and the U.S. Housing Market, 29 J. HOUS. RSCH., at S4–8, S18–19 (2020) (describing
predicted flooding increases induced by climate change and proposing policies to increase
insurance uptake by homeowners).
81. JOHN ENGLANDER, MOVING TO HIGHER GROUND: RISING SEA LEVEL AND THE PATH
FORWARD 12–15 (2021).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (authorizing federal financial support for state and local hazard
mitigation that the “President has determined [is] cost effective and which substantially reduce[s]
the risk of, or increase[s] resilience to, future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area
affected by a major disaster”).
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A. Dispossession Bias in Buyout Law
Because buyouts emanate from disaster law, they focus on asset
compensation and emergency aid. Thus, buyouts promote
dispossession bias, meaning that buyouts subordinate large-scale
residential movement into flood-safe areas to the goal of remedying
individual climate-induced dispossession.83 Conflicts between
providing individual dispossession relief and incentivizing climate-safe
settlement usually resolve in favor of the former. Dispossession bias is
also evident in other laws related to floodplain housing, such as the
NFIP’s subsidization of rebuilding flood-prone properties.
Key features of the HMGP and other FEMA buyout laws reflect
the priority accorded to dispossession relief. First, buyouts are
generously compensatory, usually offering owners full, preflood
market value for their homes.84 Some buyouts offer additional
compensation above fair market value for relocating within the
community or accepting the buyout within a specific time frame.85
While the NFIP caps payouts at $250,000, the HMGP and other federal
buyout programs do not.86 This level of compensation may be
necessary to persuade owners to sell, but this is unknowable because
the statute has never required partial compensation or bidding to
reveal owners’ reserve prices. There is no equivalent to a coinsurance
requirement for buyouts. If owners have received an NFIP insurance
payout for the flood event, however, that is deducted from their buyout
compensation.87 Only one buyout regulation, the Flood Mitigation
Assistance program, requires that the owners of acquired properties

83. This bias exists within the HMGP as well even though the statutory purpose of the
HMGP is to fund hazard mitigation measures and increase resilience to future damage. 42
U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
84. The jurisdiction applying for funding can opt to pay current market value or preflood
market value but usually chooses the latter. See FEMA, GUIDANCE, supra note 63, at 22–23. But
see Caroline M. Kraan, Miyuki Hino, Jennifer Niemann, A.R. Siders & Katharine J. Mach,
Promoting Equity in Retreat Through Voluntary Property Buyout Programs, 11 J. ENV’T STUD. &
SCI. 481, 484 (2021) (describing factors that can lead to undercompensation for lower-income
households).
85. See, e.g., Kousky, supra note 72, at 16 (discussing the incentive payments following
Hurricane Sandy).
86. However, because cost-benefit analysis is mandatory, projected housing acquisition
costs do factor into the selection of local applications for buyout funds. See 44
C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5) (2022) (requiring cost-benefit analysis for hazard mitigation grant
funding).
87. See FEMA, GUIDANCE, supra note 63, at 31 (prohibiting duplication of benefits).
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have flood insurance at the time of the state or local application for
buyout relief.88 Notably, in some states it is not clear whether buyouts
are legally necessary to acquire permanently flooded homes because
state “public trust doctrines” grant title in submerged land to the state
on behalf of its citizens and prohibit private ownership of navigable
waters.89
Second, residents must voluntarily acquiesce to buyouts,
consistent with the notion that buyouts should compensate for
dispossession, not cause it. Federal regulations stipulate that the local
or state government administering the buyout cannot use, or threaten,
eminent domain for buyouts.90 In some cases, however, local floodplain
management regulations required by FEMA in effect can force
buyouts on lower- and middle-income owners by requiring
unaffordable whole-home elevation, a point to which Part VI returns.91
The prohibition on eminent domain undermines adaptation measures
that require assembling large, contiguous parcels of land (e.g., green
space flood buffers). Also, if adaptation technology develops or
funding becomes available after the initiation of a buyout, but before
its completion, the locality likely cannot use eminent domain to

88. 44 C.F.R. § 78.12(a) (2020).
89. As climate change submerges more private land and shifts high and low tide lines, there
is increasing conflict and litigation about whether private owners can lose property rights under
the public trust doctrine. See Christopher Flavelle, The Fighting Has Begun over Who Owns Land
Drowned by Climate Change, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:00 AM) [hereinafter Flavelle, The
Fighting Has Begun], https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-04-25/fight-grows-overwho-owns-real-estate-drowned-by-climate-change [https://perma.cc/UF4T-Y6NR]. For examples of
the public trust doctrine, see, for example, ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 6; HAW. CONST. art. XII,
§ 4; VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 18C(k). States vary in the scope,
rigor, locus of lawmaking, and ease of alteration of their public trust doctrines, as well as in
whether the doctrines operate under a “title theory” that vests title in public trust property in the
state as trustee or instead require by statute or constitution that the state reserve certain resources
exclusively for public uses. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Public Trust Doctrine: Some
Jurisprudential Variations and Their Implications, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 261, 261–63 (2016).
90. 44 C.F.R. § 80.13(a)(4) (2022).
91. If the flood event has caused damage to a home equaling or exceeding 50 percent of the
structure’s market value, the homeowner may need to complete a very costly elevation of their
entire home and other floodproofing measures in order to reconstruct. For the substantial damage
rule to apply, the cost of repair must exceed 50 percent of the market value of the structure (not
including the land), the home must be in a Special Flood Hazard Area (“SFHA”), the locality
must have adopted the NFIP rules, and the structure must not meet the base flood elevation
required by the NFIP per the relevant flood insurance rate map (thus requiring elevation). See 44
C.F.R. § 60.3(c), (e) (2022) (listing NFIP local regulations); 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2022) (defining
substantial damage).
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accommodate that adaptation project in the area where it is acquiring
properties.92
Third, the selection of buyouts is based on local application,
usually following a federally defined disaster, not a ranking or
prioritization of the most climate- or cost-effective locales in which to
invest buyout funds. There is a cost-benefit analysis that localities must
meet for properties worth more than FEMA’s calculation of the
average benefit produced by a buyout (homes valued at or below this
figure automatically satisfy cost-benefit analysis).93 Cost-benefit
analysis only requires that the buyout cost less than the total
anticipated flood damage to a residence over a hundred-year period.94
The agencies also consider in the benefit column any ecosystem
services, such as water filtration or storm buffering, added by
preserving the formerly residential land as open space.95 If the core
aims of buyouts were efficient climate retreat and hazard mitigation,
we would expect federal agencies to incorporate information about an
individual property’s flood history or flood risk data (now available via
the NFIP Risk 2.0 database) to formally prioritize properties for
compensation.96
92. It is possible for the locality to use eminent domain after the buyout project closes for
adjacent or nearby adaptation projects as the prohibition on eminent domain applies specifically
to the application and buyout process. See 44 C.F.R. § 80.13(a)(4) (2022) (requiring subapplicant
to inform the applicant in writing it will not use eminent domain authority for open space
purpose).
93. See Memorandum from Kayed I. Lakhia, Deputy Dir., FEMA, to Reg’l Adm’rs
(Regions I–X) 2 (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_
acquisition-elevation-precalculated-benefits-memo_092021.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW4X-FSGP].
94. See, e.g., FEMA, SUPPLEMENT TO THE BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS REFERENCE GUIDE
1-1, 2-17 to -20 (2011), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_bca_guidesupplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU4X-JNKR] (demonstrating how FEMA performs a benefitcost analysis and compares the acquisition costs of a property to the estimated damages from
floods for a particular property over a hundred-year period).
95. FEMA, ECOSYSTEM SERVICE BENEFITS IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR FEMA’S
MITIGATION PROGRAMS POLICY 2–3 (2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/
fema_ecosystem-service-benefits_policy_september-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR88-FC8G].
96. Some local and state authorities do prioritize buyouts based on ecosystem services or
cost to the locality. This does not appear to be consistent and, even when intentions exist to
prioritize, the pattern of buyouts may not deliver strong flood control or other local benefits
because of the location or spatial configuration of acquisitions. See Todd K. BenDor, David
Salvesen, Christian Kamrath & Brooke Ganser, Floodplain Buyouts and Municipal Finance, 21
NAT. HAZARDS REV. 04020020-1, 04020020-2 to -3, 04020020-13 (2020) (explaining how holdouts
can create scattered or random buyouts even though contiguous acquisition patterns may be more
efficient); NATURE CONSERVANCY, STRATEGIC PROPERTY BUYOUTS TO ENHANCE FLOOD
RESILIENCE:
CREATING
A
MODEL
FOR
FLOOD
RISK
REDUCTION,
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Fourth, buyouts sacrifice climate retreat efficiency to give latitude
to localities for development and homeowners for relocation. For
example, the federal government does not require the locality to
commit to prohibitions on new construction on other, nonacquired
floodplain areas within the locality, beyond what is required by the
NFIP regulations adopted by the locality.97 FEMA requires localities
receiving HMGP funds or buyouts to prepare and submit a hazard
mitigation plan, but that plan may allow other construction in the
floodplain.98 The statutory provisions governing hazard mitigation
plans impose largely procedural requirements, mandating that
localities consider how to mitigate hazards, ensure public participation,
and engage in the process of local planning for hazards.99 Federal
buyout laws also do not require compensated homeowners to commit
to relocate to lower-risk housing.100 These omissions are the result of
buyouts’ origins in disaster law, predating recognition of climate
change, as well as political resistance by localities and states to limiting
development and revenue.101
Of course, buyouts are not entirely inattentive to climate retreat
goals. Buyout laws have effectuated one-by-one relocation on a modest
scale, with approximately 45,000 households relocated to date from
federally funded buyouts.102 One qualitative study that interviewed
federal and local officials implementing buyouts found that
government employees viewed the buyout as mitigating future flood
risk on the acquired properties (but owners perceived the buyout as

COMMUNITY PROTECTION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL GAINS 4 (2019), https://www.nature.org/con
tent/dam/tnc/nature/en/documents/harveybuyoutsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G3T-YV2F]
(showing inefficiently spaced, or checkerboard, pattern of Houston buyouts).
97. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 201.6(a), 201.7(a) (2022).
98. 44 C.F.R. § 201.6(a)(1) (2022).
99. See 44 C.F.R. § 201.6 (2022); FEMA, LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW GUIDE 5–28
(2011).
100. There is also no requirement that the owner have flood insurance in order to qualify for
HMGP buyouts, even when the homeowner’s federally guaranteed mortgage contract makes
flood insurance compulsory. States and localities can adopt more stringent relocation
requirements if they desire, but most either omit relocation requirements or make flood-safe
relocation a nonbinding goal of buyout. See, e.g., ORANGE CNTY, DR-4332 ORANGE COUNTY
LOCAL BUYOUT PROGRAM 2 (2020), https://www.co.orange.tx.us/media/Emergency%20Mana
gement/2020/Orange%20County%20BUYOUT%20Program%20Guidelines%20to%20post%2
010.05.2020%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/M848-QQ5N] (“The program will relocate homeowners
and their families to low risk areas outside of the floodplain/floodway . . . .”).
101. See supra note 46 and Part I.C.
102. Mach & Siders, supra note 9, at 1294.
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compensation for home loss).103 FEMA buyouts also require that the
acquired land be dedicated and maintained in perpetuity as open space
or for recreational or wetlands management uses.104 However, it is not
clear that prohibiting development on acquired land remains a core
commitment. In 2018, FEMA proposed allowing private
redevelopment of the acquired parcel by the homeowner (via buyback)
or a subsequent owner, so long as the reconstruction satisfied new
elevation requirements.105
B. Buyouts as Incentives for Buy-in
By providing generous compensation for dispossession, buyouts
create incentives to overinvest in floodplains real estate. Buyouts offer
homeowners de facto insurance payments for home loss, while
imposing no premiums or equivalent of individual coinsurance.106
Incentivizing residents to buy property in flood zones stymies efficient
retreat and commits public funds to disaster relief or often ill-fated
adaptation efforts to fight rising waters.107 It also increases total losses
from dispossession, as higher population in flood zones will create
more displacement over time as the effects of climate change worsen.

103. Sherri Brokopp Binder, Alex Greer & Elyse Zavar, Home Buyouts: A Tool for
Mitigation or Recovery?, 29 DISASTER PREVENTION & MGMT. 497, 498–504 (2020).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(b)(2)(B)(i); 44 C.F.R. § 206.434(e)(1)(i) (2022). No new structures are
permissible except for restrooms or public facilities open on four sides. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5170c(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I)–(II).
105. Christopher Flavelle, FEMA Proposes Allowing Owners To Rebuild Homes After
Taxpayer Buyouts, INS. J., (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/201
8/04/26/487448.htm [https://perma.cc/DJM6-89C5]. In addition, buyouts originating from housing
laws such as the Community Development Block Grants allow redevelopment of the flood-prone
property, but the similar CDBG-DR (disaster relief) program, also through HUD, requires the
land be preserved as open space. See Siders, supra note 39, at 243 tbl.1.
106. Specifically, because buyouts provide financial recompense, typically at preflood market
value, they lessen the financial losses to the owner. Together with subsidized national flood
insurance, buyouts thus increase the incentives for individuals to purchase homes in floodplains
and reduce the motivation to avoid flood zones or relocate away from them.
107. The dynamic that ensues with increasing numbers of floodplain home purchases across
the United States resembles what Karl S. Okamoto terms “systemic moral hazard.” See Karl S.
Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185 (2009)
(describing a pervasive imbalance of incentives where each decision maker’s “potential reward
for imprudence greatly outweigh[s] his cost”). The barriers to efficient retreat also stem from
flood insurance. A 2017 survey of residents affected by Hurricane Sandy found that when given
several options, 42 percent of respondents selected “homeowners pay for property damage at
their own cost” as the factor most likely to motivate relocation. Bukvic & Owen, supra note 21,
at 111.
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The fact that not all flood-impacted residents receive buyouts reduces
the magnitude of incentive distortions but does not eliminate the
effect.108
Buyouts reduce incentives to anticipate flood risk, as well as to
insure against home loss from flooding. If buyers assume the risk of
home loss (i.e., no buyouts are available), they are more motivated to
anticipate water rise in their target, or current, locations. This
encourages consumption of available information, such as FEMA
flood information and private risk ratings on major real estate listing
sites.109 Importantly, it creates market demand for more sophisticated
private information about an individual parcel’s water risk over time
and the predicted impact on real estate value. Limiting buyouts and
other nonemergency disaster aid also increases the incentive to procure
or maintain insurance. The expectation of a government safety net via
buyouts and other relief may partly explain why 49 percent of the
households in flood zones that lack flood insurance are high and middle
income.110
Incentive distortion from compensation is painfully evident in
studies showing that a significant number of residents use buyout funds
to purchase homes in another flood-risk area. A recent empirical study
of a large buyout in New York following Hurricane Sandy found that
over 20 percent of homeowners bought property in another coastal
flood hazard area.111 This is not an unintended consequence of buyout,
but a feature of its design. For example, federal guidance documents
advise localities implementing buyouts with HUD CDBG-DR funds to
“[e]ncourage resettlement, not out-migration,” to preserve their tax
base and suggest that localities offer incentives to resettle in the same
community.112

108. Selective buyouts are a form of partial compensation. Partial compensation reduces the
magnitude but does not fully negate incentive effects. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 542, 583–84.
109. See Kleimann, infra note 214.
110. See Thomas Frank, Pressure Builds on Congress To Help People Afford Pricey Flood
Insurance, SCI. AM. (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pressure-buildson-congress-to-help-people-afford-pricey-flood-insurance [https://perma.cc/63U5-RVE9] (reporting
that “51 percent of homeowners in high-risk areas are low-income”).
111. Devon J. McGhee, Sherri Brokopp Binder & Elizabeth A. Albright, First, Do No Harm:
Evaluating the Vulnerability Reduction of Post-Disaster Home Buyout Programs, 21 NAT.
HAZARDS REV. 05019002-1, 05019002-1 (2020).
112. See HUD, BUYOUT PROGRAM 2 (2013), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/
documents/Disaster_Recovery_Buyout_Program_Design_Implementation_Toolkit.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MTY4-4W3M].

STERN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

188

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/16/2022 11:53 AM

[Vol. 72:161

Buyouts distort not only the location and housing investment
decisions of compensation recipients, but also those of a much larger
group of onlookers (i.e., citizens deciding whether to locate or remain
in a floodplain). For these homebuyers and owners, compensation
lessens the financial risk of buying or owning coastal or riverine
homes.113 As a result, they are more likely to buy in coastal and other
flood-prone areas—decisions that real estate developers readily
accommodate. Although buyouts usually become publicly owned open
space, not enough land is restricted to make a sizeable dent in housing
supply on the floodplains.114 There would need to be a massive program
of buyouts and strict zoning controls on housing in floodplains (e.g.,
prohibitions on flood zone construction and limiting the supply of
multifamily buildings) to preclude mobility.
Government buyouts, which subsidize homeowner losses, also
slow market corrections for coastal and other floodplain real estate.
Prices are beginning to decline for coastal real estate (although inmigration to coastal areas continues to increase).115 Buyouts, and to an
even greater degree subsidized flood insurance, impede the
capitalization of climate risk into real estate pricing by reducing
financial risk, and thus handicap the marketplace as a regulatory
alternative.116 In many circumstances, risk-based insurance and real
estate pricing are able to offer more differentiated and dynamic
responses to climate risk than the government is.117 In addition,
buyouts may decrease buyers’ perceptions of personal danger from

113. This occurs because compensation distorts incentives and promotes overinvestment. For
a description of these incentive effects in the transition relief literature, see generally Kaplow,
supra note 15.
114. The current funding and size of buyout programs are modest, with fewer than fifty
thousand buyouts to date, and unlikely to be scalable to address the millions who will face
inundation across this century. See Mach & Siders, supra note 9, at 1294 (reporting the number of
buyouts); Hauer et al., supra note 1 (finding over thirteen million individuals are threatened with
inundation by 2100).
115. See, e.g., Steven A. McAlpine & Jeremy R. Porter, Estimating Recent Local Impacts of
Sea-Level Rise on Current Real-Estate Losses: A Housing Market Case Study in Miami-Dade,
Florida, 37 POPULATION RSCH. & POL’Y REV. 871, 891–93 (2018). But see Justin Murfin &
Matthew Spiegel, Is the Risk of Sea Level Rise Capitalized in Residential Real Estate?, 33 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1217, 1217 (2020) (finding limited price effects of sea-level rise).
116. For a discussion of the effect of subsidized flood insurance on risky development, see
PILKEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 84–87.
117. The electricity market offers an example of dynamic response in markets, including
regulated markets. See Goutam Dutta & Krishnendranath Mitra, A Literature Review on
Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 68 J. OPERATIONAL RSCH. SOC’Y 1131, 1135–41 (2017).
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floodplain occupation if they interpret the government’s decision to
compensate, rather than prohibit floodplain development, as an
imprimatur of safety.
It is difficult to quantify the effect of buyout laws on flood zone
development and buy-in because of the confounding effect of
subsidized flood insurance and the relatively limited number of
buyouts to date. With respect to flood subsidies, there is empirical
evidence that below-market-rate federal flood insurance has increased
residential development in floodplains.118 There is also a vast economic
literature finding that in general subsidies for goods and services
increase their consumption, in some cases to the detriment of
environmental or other interests.119 Government buyouts of homes in
flood zones (i.e., fully subsidized, de facto home loss insurance) should
produce similar incentives for overinvestment in flood-prone
housing.120
In the likely event that buyout funding expands, the incentive
problem will increase. Federal funding of buyouts has increased in the
past decade, as has the number of locally and state-funded buyouts.121

118. See WALTER A. ROSENBAUM & GARY BOULWARE, AM. INSTS. FOR RSCH., THE
DEVELOPMENTAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: A SUMMARY RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2006), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-07/fema_nfip_eval_dei_summary_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4MB-2AP8] (finding,
in the majority of research, that subsidized flood insurance created incentives for the development
of coastal areas and wetlands); see also Kenneth J. Bagstad, Kevin Stapleton & John R.
D’Agostino, Taxes, Subsidies, and Insurance as Drivers of United States Coastal Development, 63
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 285, 285 (2006) (“Government intervention in the market, particularly
through taxes, subsidies, and insurance, plays a major role in influencing [coastal] development
patterns worldwide, and especially in the United States.”).
119. For a description of the economic arguments, see, for example, Norman Myers, Lifting
the Veil on Perverse Subsidies, 392 NATURE 327, 327–28 (1998) (describing both direct
government subsidies and failures of government to regulate or price environmental
externalities); see also PILKEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 89 (arguing that removing communities
from low-lying coastal areas would reduce forced “bail out” from taxpayers).
120. The effects of subsidy are well established for a number of government programs
addressing climate-related harms. In addition to the studies on flood insurance subsidies, see
generally PILKEY ET AL., supra note 21, there is also research indicating that government subsidies
for wildfire suppression on public lands (i.e., firefighting) increases development on nearby
private lands compared to less government intervention. See S HEILA O LMSTEAD, CAROLYN
KOUSKY & ROGER SEDJO , U.S. JOINT FIRE SCI. PROGRAM , WILDLAND FIRE S UPPRESSION
AND L AND D EVELOPMENT IN THE W ILDLAND/U RBAN I NTERFACE 7–8 (2012), https://
digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=jfspresearch [https:// perma.cc/BN87EPR9].
121. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEMA NEEDS TO
IMPROVE
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A recent, high-profile proposal for flood insurance reform advocated a
major expansion of buyouts by granting preflood-fair-market-value
compensation to NFIP policyholders when their property damage
exceeds 50 percent of home value.122 A flurry of scholarly work in
environmental policy also positions buyouts as the primary policy
instrument for climate retreat.123
If buyouts, coupled with permanent restrictions on development,
could be accomplished for all properties at risk and there were no other
lots that could be developed, the incentives for risky housing choice
would not be an issue. The at-risk population would be relocated and
new development disallowed. No aspect of this is currently true. First,
there is not nearly enough funding to offer full, or even partial, market
value compensation for the number of properties at risk.124 As
researchers Matthew Hauer, Jason M. Evans, and Deepak Mishra, who
model climate risk and population trends, observe, “managed retreats
have tended to involve small populations and areas, but future action
could be needed in areas . . . with much larger and growing
populations.”125 Also, not all buyout programs prohibit redevelopment
of purchased lots, and future development is often possible on other
flood-prone lots outside the buyout area.
Second, pervasive regulatory failure and constitutional
compensation requirements prevent zoning out residences on
floodplains. Rezoning to prohibit existing residences would require
localities to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, a
financial nonstarter in most cases.126 For new construction, localities
are reluctant to zone out development and forgo tax revenues and

OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM PROPERTY AC
QUISITIONS 1 (June 22, 2022), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-06/OIG-2246-Jun22.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ84-KEN2] (describing an increase in federal funding); Peterson
et al., supra note 48, at 15 (describing the “recent trend” toward increasing state and local buyout
funding).
122. WEBER & MOORE, supra note 11, at 16, 22 n.49 .
123. See, e.g., supra notes 7, 9, 11 (citing research that addresses managed retreat as climate
adaptation policy).
124. Cf. Henry P. Huntington, Eban Goodstein & Eugénie Euskirchen, Towards a Tipping
Point in Responding to Change: Risking Costs, Fewer Options for Arctic and Global Societies, 41
AMBIO 66, 67 (2012) (concluding that “government policy for climate-driven economic
dislocation” is unlikely to be generous in light of limited funding for other economic events, such
as urban decline or military base closings).
125. Hauer et al., supra note 1, at 693 (footnotes omitted).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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development fees, particularly for lucrative coastal development.127 Of
course, if localities paid the full cost of local flood damage, they would
typically seek to restrict development where the costs of flooding
exceed tax revenues. However, the federal and state governments
provide most of the funding for disaster relief and major infrastructure
projects, creating an incentive mismatch between localities who gain
revenues from floodplains development and the federal and state
governments who fund disaster response and risk mitigation for these
ill-conceived developments.128 State regulation also fails to provide a
regulatory backstop. Most states are reluctant to intrude on local
zoning in floodplains or even to prohibit development in the most
severe flood risk zones.129
For its part, the federal government is on shaky ground when it
attempts to regulate local land.130 Congress has had to resort to
withholding funds for developing certain coastal lands or offering
incentives, such as qualifying communities for public flood insurance
in exchange for local hazard management.131 For example, the NFIP
requires communities to adopt floodplain management plans for
residents to qualify for flood insurance.132 However, federal regulations
for these plans primarily require elevating and floodproofing new
construction, except in more strictly regulated floodways (i.e., the
channel of the watercourse and its immediate banks).133 There are also
127. Kousky, supra note 72, at 16 (discussing concerns about managed retreat’s effect on the
local tax base and possible sources of replacement revenue).
128. See BenDor et al., supra note 96, at 04020020-8 to -10.
129. State statutes do sometimes require localities to participate in the NFIP. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 103F.165.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
131. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(d)(1)–(3) (2022) (requiring localities to restrict development on
floodways for residents to be eligible for public flood insurance); see also 16 U.S.C. § 3504
(limiting federal funding on barrier islands and other coastal barrier land).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 4022(a)(2)(A).
133. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2022). The statute calls for regulations that, in turn, call upon localities
to:
(1) constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage where
appropriate,
(2) guide the development of proposed construction away from locations which are
threatened by flood hazards,
(3) assist in reducing damage caused by floods, and
(4) otherwise improve the long-range land management and use of flood-prone areas.
42 U.S.C. § 4102. In addition, under the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, the federal government
will not provide federal financial assistance for development in barrier islands and coastal barrier
regions, including flood insurance coverage, loans, funding for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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significant enforcement issues, with research reporting local
noncompliance with the NFIP building and other regulations ranging
from 15 percent to 42 percent.134
Congress could amend the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, which
denies federal financial assistance and flood insurance (NFIP) for
development in barrier islands and coastal barrier regions, to apply to
other areas with severe flood risk.135 This would limit local access to
federal funds and exclude residents in severe flood zones from buyouts
and subsidized national flood insurance, forcing them onto the private
market. By removing federal financial support, this reform would
disincentivize residential settlement in floodplains. However, it
appears politically improbable that Congress will preclude federal
buyouts and flood insurance in flood-risk areas. Such a change would
also impose harms on low-income floodplains residents, a point to
which Part V returns.136
C. The Regressivity of Dispossession Bias
One justification for remedying dispossession at the expense of
climate retreat efficiency would be the potential benefits to vulnerable
populations, who face the steepest economic and personal impacts
from home loss. To the contrary, buyout laws are quite regressive.
First, because buyouts compensate for owned homes, these laws
bestow financial compensation for loss on owners, rather than renters.
Low-income floodplains neighborhoods have high concentrations of
tenants, while owners dominate middle-income and affluent coastal

development projects, and water, sewage, and transportation infrastructure funding. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3501–3510.
134. MARGARET L. MATHIS & SUZANNE NICHOLSON, AN EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM PART B: ARE MINIMUM BUILDING
REQUIREMENTS BEING MET?, at viii (2006), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/
fema_nfip_eval_commun
ity_compliance_b.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ6C-LWTM]; JACQUELYN L. MONDAY, KRISTEN Y.
GRILL, PAUL ESFORMES & MATTHEW ENG, AN EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM PART A: ACHIEVING COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE, at
x (2006), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_nfip_eval_community_comp
liance_a.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3L8-DWVL].
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3510. This Author thanks Heather Payne for this interesting
suggestion.
136. See infra Part V.
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areas.137 Tenants receive compensation under the Uniform Relocation
Act (“URA”) for their moving expenses and the difference between
their former rent and new rent for forty-two months, subject to a
relatively low cap of $7200.138 Outside of the URA, disaster
appropriations could be allocated more generously to tenants, but in
practice homeowners receive the lion’s share of financial benefits.139
Second, the lack of means testing (i.e., selection based on the
financial need of affected owners) in buyouts is regressive.140 The
justification for universal eligibility is that buyouts attend to the fact of
dispossession and goal of relocation. If floods threaten home loss, and
necessitate relocation to safer ground, then shouldn’t government
compensation be available to all? In fact, the law allows middle- or
upper-income owners to receive more federal dollars based on the
higher value of their homes, which is an appropriate result if one views
buyouts as compensation for residential asset loss but not if one sees
buyouts as effectuating fair and efficient climate retreat.141 On the
other hand, lower-value homes are more likely to satisfy cost-benefit
analysis due to their lower acquisition costs, which may increase
progressivity. Also, it is possible that in practice some states, localities,
or federal agencies may mitigate regressivity by prioritizing lowerincome residents or communities for buyout funding.142
Third, buyouts favor better-resourced localities and states by
imposing cost-share requirements and requiring states or localities to
137. See Leah A. Dundon & Janey S. Camp, Climate Justice and Home-Buyout Programs:
Renters as a Forgotten Population in Managed Retreat Actions, 11 J. ENV. STUD. & SCIS. 420, 422
(2021).
138. 49 C.F.R. § 24.402(a) (2022). The payout can be in installments or a lump sum. 49 C.F.R.
§ 24.402(b)(3) (2022).
139. See Dundon & Camp, supra note 137, at 422–24. A recent study found that homeowners
receive more than four times as much CDBG-DR disaster relief funding as renters, primarily
because homeowners receive compensation for loss or damage to their homes. JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUS. STUD . AT H ARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 2022, at 42 (2022), https://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housin
g_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKD4-KH33].
140. An exception to this is that a regulation of the HMGP may decrease the cost share to 10
percent for “small and impoverished communit[ies]”—that is, economically disadvantaged
communities with under 3000 residents—and allow regional administrators in “extraordinary
circumstances” to allow them to submit their hazard mitigation plan within twelve months
following the grant, rather than requiring it in the application. 44 C.F.R. § 206.434(b)(2) (2022).
141. See FEMA, GUIDANCE, supra note 63, at 22–23.
142. It is possible that the FEMA application process favors lower-value homes because
homes valued below the average value of a buyout ($274,000) do not need to satisfy cost-benefit
analysis, while higher-value homes do. Memorandum from Kayed I. Lakhia, supra note 93.
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apply for funding.143 The statutory cost-share requirements for the
HMGP144 and other FEMA programs benefit residents of states and
localities with more funds. At the extreme, the statute allows affluent
owners to fund the 25 percent cost share,145 a provision that seems
likely to motivate funding grabs by upper-income homeowners as
flooding worsens. HUD Community Development Block Grants and
Disaster Relief Grants sometimes provide all or part of the state or
local cost share, and those grants are subject to requirements that 70
percent of funding should benefit low- to moderate-income
individuals.146 However, the CDBG-DR statute includes a waiver
provision that is routinely exercised after floods and other disasters to
fund owners above the income threshold.147
In addition to the cost-share hurdle, localities must provide the
personnel and funding to implement buyouts. Localities must apply to
FEMA for funds, conduct cost-benefit analyses, and engage in
intensive planning culminating in a local hazard mitigation plan.148 The
buyout process takes localities on average more than five years from
flood to project closeout.149 The local government is typically
responsible for required disclosures to homeowners, appraisal,
purchase negotiation, title transfer, and restricting and maintaining the
acquired land as open space. Considering the financial and personnel
burdens to localities, it is not surprising that recent research has found

143. States may also implement buyouts, but in practice the local government usually plays
the role of implementer.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
145. FEMA, HOMEOWNER’S GUIDE TO THE HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM 3
(2016)
[hereinafter FEMA, HOMEOWNER’S GUIDE], https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/document
s/fema_homeowners_guide_hazard_mitigation_grant_program_11-04-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJ5W-GBCT].
146. See JOSEPH V. JAROSCAK & MICHAEL H. CECIRE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46475, THE
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT’S DISASTER RECOVERY (CDBG-DR) COMPONENT:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1–2, 2 n.5 (2020).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 5321.
148. See 44 C.F.R. § 201.6 (2022) (requiring localities to submit a hazard mitigation plan for
HMGP funding); FEMA, BCA REFERENCE GUIDE 3-1 to -7 (2009), https://www.fema.gov/sites/
default/files/2020-04/fema_bca_reference-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6RG-U2B2] (offering
guidance on the cost-benefit analysis required for an HMGP application).
149. See WEBER & MOORE, supra note 11.
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that counties with local buyout programs were wealthier, and whiter,
than impacted counties where buyouts did not occur.150
In summary, buyouts have focused on providing dispossession
relief to flooded homeowners. In doing so, buyouts have exacerbated
the problem that compensation was meant to remedy by creating
incentives for households to move to climate risk zones (thus
increasing total dispossession over time).151 In addition, federal buyout
programs, which provide owner compensation at preflood fair market
value and require local implementation, are alarmingly regressive and
provide limited relief to the most vulnerable floodplains residents,
particularly low-income renters.
III. TRANSITION RELIEF THEORY FOR CLIMATE RETREAT
Scores of articles, government white papers, NGO reports, and
state-commissioned studies have examined the implementation,
outcomes, and equity of federal buyout programs without considering
whether buyouts subsidize risky housing choice.152 Some researchers
fault the moral hazard in subsidized flood insurance, but omit
buyouts.153 Only a few critics, most notably oceanographer and activist
John Englander, flag the incentives posed by buyout compensation or
consider how to reform buyouts to reduce moral hazard.154
150. See Mach et al., supra note 58, at 3, 5–6 (finding comparatively better-off counties were
more likely to administer buyouts, but the zip code areas where properties were acquired were
relatively poorer); Elliott et al., supra note 14, at 12 (showing racial differences). Mach and
coauthors suggest that the higher likelihood of buyouts in wealthier counties “may be indicative
of the substantial human, financial, and other capacity required for a local government to
implement a buyout.” Mach et al., supra note 58, at 5. A confounding factor not addressed in the
study is demand and the possibility there is more demand for buyouts in affluent counties.
151. The effect of disaster relief on incentives for risk reduction is a pivotal issue for
adaptation, extending beyond buyout laws and of major interest in EU flood policy. See, e.g.,
Jongman, supra note 31, at 2 (noting that ad hoc disaster relief in the EU is associated with
reduced incentives for risk reduction).
152. See supra notes 7–11, 21, 39, 79–80.
153. See Pappas & Flatt, Climate Changes Property, supra note 11, at 342–49. Pappas and
Flatt argue that buyouts lessen “unacceptably high [market] adjustment failure costs” and suggest
that market adjustment failure analysis can guide when to recommodify or decommodify
property. See id. at 387–89. But see Heather Payne, Rhinoceroses Are Not Like Sneakers, 82 OHIO
ST. L.J. 71, 78–81 (2021) (noting some shortcomings of the market adjustment failure model).
154. See ENGLANDER, supra note 81, at 140 (describing the moral hazard created by
subsidized flood insurance and noting that buyouts similarly transfer the risk of building on the
shore from developers and buyers to the government); see also Wendy Karen Bragg, Sara Tasse
Gonzalez, Ando Rabearisoa & Amanda Daria Stoltz, Communicating Managed Retreat in
California, 13 WATER 781, 791 (2021) (noting the “distorting effect” of buybacks on the real
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Outside of the climate retreat scholarship, however, a robust
theoretical literature on transition relief has explored how government
compensation for changes in legal rules distorts investor incentives.
Seminal works in transition relief theory by Michael J. Graetz and
Louis Kaplow posit that compensating investors for changes in tax or
other legal rules produces losses from overinvestment (incentive
distortion) that outweigh the gains from remedying concentrated losses
(risk spreading).155
This Part describes the classic theory of transition relief and
considers its applicability to climate transitions. It suggests applying the
lodestars of classic transition relief theory (incentive distortion and risk
spreading) to federal flood buyouts and introduces a model of “climate
transition relief,” which the balance of the Article develops.
A. Classic Transition Relief Theory
Transition relief theory emanates from law and economics and
considers the question of what government action, if any, is necessary
when laws change after citizens or regulated entities have made prior
commitments based on the former rule.156 For example, if an individual
or business invested in a certain financial instrument based on
regulatory laws advantaging that financial instrument or IRS
regulations affording it favorable tax treatment, the adoption of new
legal rules would injure those who had invested based on the former
laws. The intention of transition relief is to mitigate the losses of
investors who relied on the previous legal rule when they invested.
Transition relief can take the form of compensation, phasing in changes

estate market); Thomas Ruppert, John Fergus & Enio Russe-Garcia, Managing Property Buyouts
at the Local Level: Seeking Benefits and Limiting Harms, 48 ENV’T L. REP. 10,520, 10,529 (2018)
(suggesting that localities adopt ordinances regulating buyouts and that to address the incentive
problems created by buyouts, “maybe a property owner purchasing, or taking title, after passage
of a local buyout ordinance [should] either not [be] eligible to participate [in a buyout], or [should]
only be eligible for a far lower price offer than a neighbor who had owned for a longer period of
time”); cf. E. Barrett Ristroph, Avoiding Maladaptations to Flooding and Erosions: A Case Study
of Alaska Native Villages, 24 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 110, 131–32 (2019) (stating that “[t]he moral
hazard problem associated with post-flood bailouts in the United States is more nuanced for
[Alaskan Native Villages] and other indigenous communities” because many were forced into
flood-prone areas and living together as a tribe is the priority).
155. See generally Graetz, supra note 15 (examining the effects of grandfathering changes in
income tax rules); Kaplow, supra note 15 (arguing that compensation for regulatory change
produces overinvestment and decreases investor motivation to anticipate changes).
156. See supra note 15.
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gradually, grandfathering (i.e., exemption from new regulation), or
other benefits offered by the government.157
The historical view of legal transitions was that it would be unjust
and would unsettle expectations to change a law without offering relief
to individuals who had made investments or decisions in reliance on
the law in effect at that time.158 Scholars as well as policymakers have
advocated compensating for the disruption of established property
rights and other legal rights, on both efficiency and fairness grounds.159
The tradition of protecting crystallized expectations of legal rights and
“reliance interests” is particularly prominent within property law
theory. One of the earliest proponents of this view, Hume, deemed
stability of property a societal prerequisite, stating that “the
convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of
possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the
establishment of human society.”160 In a similar vein, Bentham
conceived of property as creating a “basis of expectation” requisite to
labor and investment.161 The stabilizing function of property finds

157. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 512.
158. See Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A Presumptive Vote for the
Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 (2003); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1219 (1967) (offering fairness justifications for compensation). Michelman
contended that when individuals experience high losses, the cost of compensation or other
transition relief is low (settlement costs), and the social benefits of the regulatory change are
limited or uncertain, the government should offer compensation, but not when settlement costs
are high and individual losses low. Id. at 1215. For an overview of the reliance and fairness
theories, see Revesz & Kong, supra note 15, at 1585–87.
159. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 187–88, 209–
11 (1977); Harold M. Hochman, Rule Change and Transitional Equity, in REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 323–24 (Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson eds., 1974);
Michelman, supra note 158, at 1219, 1223–24 (advocating an approach to compensation that
considers fairness and the demoralization from lack of compensation); cf. Jill E. Fisch,
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibria Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1105–11
(1997) (arguing a stable legal equilibrium justifies honoring reliance interests while an unstable
equilibrium does not because the expectation of stability and reliance is unreasonable in the latter
situation).
160. DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 315–16 (David Fate Norton & Mary J.
Norton eds., 2000).
161. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111–12 (R. Hildreth trans.,
Trübner & Co. 2d ed. 1924) (1871) (“Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the
expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess . . . .”).
Bentham propounded a positivist view of law with property reflecting “the institutionally
established understanding that extant rules governing the relationships among men with respect
to resources will continue in existence.” Michelman, supra note 158, at 1211–12.
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traction among modern theorists as well, also on utilitarian grounds.
For example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky define
property as creating and enforcing stable ownership that confers value,
and Richard Posner describes how stability of property cultivates
incentives to invest.162
In the 1970s, an influential body of scholarship emerged
challenging government compensation on the basis of reliance,
expectations, and general notions of fairness. The transition relief
literature derives most famously from the work of Michael Graetz
advocating against retroactivity, such as grandfathering in or phase-ins,
for changes in tax law.163 Graetz argued that retroactivity increases
incentives for overinvestment, reduces the benefits from the tax law
change, and increases enforcement costs. In addition, basing transition
relief on reliance presumes it is reasonable to expect that laws will not
change over time and that reliance interests outweigh the social
benefits of the legal change.164
Louis Kaplow subsequently extended this analysis beyond tax law
to regulatory transition relief. A regulatory transition occurs when
investors have based prior commitments on a legal rule and those
commitments were made at a time that a new legal rule could not have
been predicted with certainty.165 In his view, transition relief, such as
compensation, grandfathering, or phase-ins, “is inefficient because it
insulates investors from the real effects of their decisions, and thus
distorts their behavior.”166 Specifically, the assurance of government
compensation incentivizes overinvestment in property that may be
subject to a legal, or market, change and reduces the incentive for
investors to anticipate future legal changes.167 Accordingly, Kaplow
argued that governments should not offer compensation for
162. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–44 (8th ed. 2011); Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property Law, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538, 564
(2005). But see SHELLY KREICZER-LEVY, DESTABILIZING PROPERTY 16–37 (2019) (describing
how the emerging sharing economy disrupts the “legal ideal” of property stability).
163. See Graetz, supra note 15, at 65–66.
164. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 513 (examining the “familiar arguments for government
transitional relief that rest on appeals to reliance interests and to the lack of expectation of legal
change”).
165. Id. at 512–13.
166. Id. at 513.
167. Id. at 615 (“To the extent that a given transition policy mitigates the impact of future
reforms on preexisting investment, those currently making investment decisions will not have the
proper incentive to take into account the prospects of future reform.”).
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transitions, including, for example, compensation for eminent domain
or retroactivity following changes in common law tort doctrines.168
Transition relief theory, like the reliance theories described previously,
relies on incentives for investment to justify its conclusions. But while
reliance theorists fret that there will be too little incentive to invest
without compensation, transition relief theorists predict that
compensation will produce too much incentive to invest in the good
protected by a current law (because investors will receive
compensation for later changes to that law).
Transition relief theory also presumes that private markets are
superior to government at achieving the optimal tradeoff between
incentive distortion and risk spreading to avoid concentrated losses.
Kaplow observes that “[d]irect government compensation differs from
private insurance in a number of important respects.”169 Specifically,
“it is provided by the government, it is typically considered to be full
(whereas many insurance contracts or other diversification channels
only partially spread the risk), no conditions for efficient behavior are
bargained for, and no premium need be paid.”170 As a result,
compensation for the incidental losses from legal transitions, as
opposed to purposeful social redistribution by the government,
amounts to an exceptionally inefficient insurance policy. Because
government compensation does not increase risk spreading beyond
what the private market would offer, its benefits do not outweigh the
losses from incentive distortion.171
Responding to Kaplow’s claim that transition relief is inevitably
inefficient, Steven Shavell applied the theory’s touchstones of
individual loss (risk spreading) and incentive distortion to show that
partial transition relief is efficient in certain circumstances.172
Specifically, grandfathering is preferable to no transition relief for
durable goods (e.g., expensive equipment, residential homes) when the
individual costs to the investor are greater than the social benefits.173
Shavell considered firms that had purchased expensive pollution
control equipment and homeowners in locations with zoning changes,

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 598–606.
Id. at 541.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Shavell, supra note 18.
Id. at 37.
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where requiring new purchases or substantial residential retrofitting
would be more costly to owners than the marginal social benefit of
imposing the new regulation. Shavell noted that in these cases existing
laws restrained incentive effects and overinvestment.174
Transition relief intersects the related concept of moral hazard
from economics and insurance research.175 Laws create a “moral
hazard” when citizens do not bear the full consequences of their risktaking and thus have an incentive to take more risks and engage in less
preventative effort.176 Research on bank lending, auto insurance, and
even experimental work on risky gambles in which participants share
losses substantiates the theory that people take more risks when they
do not bear the full costs of their actions.177 To remedy moral hazard,
insurers must either improve the insured’s incentives, typically by
imposing coinsurance, or engage in costly monitoring. Altering
incentives concentrates more risk on insureds and puts their “skin in
the game,” but at the cost of reducing risk spreading.178
In summary, the transition relief scholarship views government
compensation as a tradeoff between individual relief and incentive
distortion. Distilling the scholarly contributions of the transition relief
literature yields two insights important to the analysis of residential
climate transitions. First, the transition relief scholarship establishes
the risk of incentive distortion and overinvestment from the reflexive
174. Id.
175. With respect to sea-level rise and residential real estate, moral hazard occurs when
people are more likely to buy property in climate danger zones or remain there as flood risk
increases. See ENGLANDER, supra note 81, at 140.
176. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979)
(“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual’s motive
to prevent loss.”). Moral hazard first appeared in the economics literature to describe increased
expenditures due to the insured’s eligibility for insurance benefits that create deadweight losses
by encouraging the insured to seek additional services after marginal benefit drops below
marginal cost. See Marshall, supra note 78; David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the
Term “Moral Hazard”, 79 J. RISK & INS. 1051, 1059 (2012) (noting insurance induces individuals
to invest less in prevention).
177. See Michael T. Bixter & Christian C. Luhmann, Shared Losses Reduce Sensitivity to Risk:
A Laboratory Study of Moral Hazard, 42 J. ECON. PSYCH. 63, 69–71 (2013); Shavell, supra note
176, at 541, 551.
178. As researcher John M. Marshall writes, “It is widely recognized that the cost of
improving incentives [by making insureds pay higher coinsurance rates] is inevitably a reduction
in the efficiency of risk spreading.” Marshall, supra note 78, at 890; see also Bixter & Luhmann,
supra note 177, at 64 (defining moral hazard as “any situation where an individual or institution
is making decisions that have potential negative consequences that will be fully or partially shared
with other parties”).
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disbursement of government transition relief.179 Second, the literature
illuminates factors that are important to the efficiency of transition
relief, including the magnitude of incentive distortion versus risk
spreading, the costs and social benefits of the change in question, and
the presence or likelihood of emerging private markets for risk
spreading. These theoretical contributions offer a starting place for
reconceiving buyouts but also have limitations when applied to
economically heterogeneous floodplains and the project of climate
retreat, as Parts V and VI address.
B. Flood Buyouts as Climate Transition Relief
Classic transition relief theory offers a conceptual springboard for
re-envisioning flood buyouts as a climate transition policy that balances
the incentive for buying into flood zones against remedying individual
losses. Just as transitions occur when tax rules and regulations change,
flooding creates legal transitions for affected residents. Rising water
alters property rights in a number of ways under state property laws.180
The public trust doctrine, which operates under state constitutional,
statutory, or common law, grants title in submerged lands to the
state.181 Currently, there is uncertainty and conflict about whether
homeowners whose lot or home becomes partially or fully submerged
lose their property rights to the state.182 When water shifts, private
owners may also suffer public access across the “wet sand” portions of
their property under the common law or, in Texas, a statute mandating
“rolling easements” in the public.183 Climate change has also affected
development rights, with localities and regional coastal commissions in

179. See generally Kaplow, supra note 15 (noting incentive distortion from compensation for
regulatory change); Graetz, supra note 15 (noting incentive problems from grandfathering when
tax laws change).
180. For an overview of how flooding and managed retreat change property rights, see Laura
M. Padilla, Does a Rising Tide Lift All Boats? Sea Level Rise, Land Use, and Property Rights, 51
TEX. ENV’T L.J. 27, 94–104 (2021) (describing how using downzoning, rolling easements, the
public trust doctrine, and transferable development rights to accomplish managed retreat changes
property rights and raises controversy).
181. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 463–64 (1892) (holding that Illinois could
not convey title to submerged lands to a private corporation as the title was held in trust by the
state for the public).
182. See Flavelle, The Fighting Has Begun, supra note 89.
183. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011(a); Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 732
(Tex. 2012) (noting that “public easements in the dry beach . . . are dynamic, as natural forces
cause the vegetation and the mean high tide lines to move gradually and imperceptibly”).
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some cases restricting further development of residential property
(e.g., expansions or additions) and debating prohibitions on rebuilding
after a major inundation.184 In addition, flood insurance law is
beginning to phase out subsidies and increase premiums, subject to
grandfathering provisions applicable to residential policies that
predate certain changes in the NFIP.185
In addition to legal changes, homeowners on floodplains are
subject to market transitions due to the capitalization of climate risk
into real estate prices. As Kaplow notes, market shifts are “analytically
equivalent” to legal transitions, and government compensation for
market changes has the same effect as legal transition relief on
investment and incentive distortion.186 Because real estate markets
capitalize flood risk into home prices, increasing numbers of owners
owe more than their homes are worth or will lose money on a future
sale. These market changes injure the interests of homeowners, much
like changes to legal rules, and raise the question of whether the
government should offer transition relief.
This Article reconceptualizes buyouts from dispossession
compensation to a climate transition relief policy that is conscious of
incentive structure and context sensitive. It retains classic transition
relief theory’s distillation of compensation’s effects on incentive
distortion and risk spreading (concentrated losses). However, as Parts
IV and V discuss, these factors play out differently on the
heterogeneous floodplains based on resident wealth. While buyouts
create incentives for middle- and higher-income owners, with means
and mobility, to locate in the floodplains, low-income owners are far
less vulnerable to incentive distortion from compensation.
Affordability, not choice, usually drives their location in riverine
floodplains and wetlands.187
Climate change also requires a broader scope than classic
transition relief theory’s focus on owner-investors. On the incomebifurcated floodplains, not only owners but also tenants suffer

184.

See JESSICA GRANNIS, GEO. CLIMATE CTR., ADAPTATION TOOLKIT: SEA-LEVEL RISE
COASTAL LAND USE 31–32 (2011), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/
Adapt ation_Tool_Kit_SLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMF5-UQDT].
185. See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205,
125 Stat. 405, 917 (2012); FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FLOOD INSURANCE
MANUAL 1-2, 3-7 to -8 (2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_nfipflood-insurance-manual-sections-1-6_oct2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VZ9-3VBQ].
186. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 582.
187. See infra Part V.
AND
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residential dislocation from flooding. Flood transitions will sometimes
require subsidy outside the frame of asset ownership and loss
contemplated in classic transition relief theory. Part VI advocates
buyout funding for renters, as well as subsidies in some circumstances.
IV. CLIMATE TRANSITION RELIEF: LIMITING ELIGIBILITY FOR
COMPENSATION
Viewing buyouts as a questionable form of transition relief raises
fundamental questions. First, should homeowners receive relief for
home loss caused by climate-induced flooding? And if so, should we
extend relief to all affected owners or only to specific subgroups? This
Part contends that the tradeoffs between individual dispossession relief
and the more impactful goal of incentivizing larger-scale shifts out of
flood zones counsel against unrestricted transition relief. Contrary to
the weight of policy and scholarly analysis, this Article advocates as a
starting place a presumption against gratis buyouts for middle- and
upper-income homeowners (the next Part discusses a substantial carveout to this presumption for low-income residents via means testing).
This Part also considers potential exceptions to a no-compensation rule
for middle- and upper-income owners, including when flooding
threatens grave physical harm, and the possibility of insurance for
relocation. Of note, this Part describes income groups in general terms
and leaves to policymakers the specific demarcation of income levels
eligible for buyouts.
A. Incentives and Risk Spreading
For transition relief to distort location decisions, households must
have control over where they locate. Higher-income households are
more likely to have the financial means and access to lending markets
to choose whether or not to purchase in flood-safe zones. In general,
these households tend to move greater distances—an important point
for retreat from floodplains. For example, demographic research
consistently finds that higher-income households are more likely to
move out of a county or state, while lower-income households are more
likely to relocate within the same county.188 Of course, this does not
mean that flood-safe location choices are costless for higher-income
188. See, e.g., DAVID K. IHRKE & CAROL S. FABER, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., GEOGRAPHICAL
MOBILITY: 2005 TO 2010, at 5 tbl.2 (2012), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/p
ublications/2012/demo/p20-567.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX78-8GSS] (comparing move rates by
income group).
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households. Employment, commute time, or personal attachments
may underlie preferences for riskier locations. In some cases, higherincome owners can satisfy these preferences by purchasing higherelevation properties within coastal areas, a practice referred to as
“climate gentrification.”189
The precise magnitude of the effect of buyout compensation on
middle- and upper-income households’ incentives for high-risk housing
is an empirical question, one that is fiendishly difficult to untangle.190
As discussed previously, there is evidence that another form of
government relief, subsidized public flood insurance, correlates with
increasing residential development in floodplains.191 Of course,
government compensation affects behavior on average, not
universally. For example, ultrahigh-net-worth individuals can absorb
losses on coastal real estate and appear willing to when the locale
boasts attractive oceanfront amenities or favorable state tax laws.192
The other focal point of transition relief is the magnitude of
concentrated loss, meaning the degree to which an investor can spread
risk.193 While the NFIP has not proven nearly as efficient as the private
insurance markets envisioned by Kaplow and other transition relief
scholars, it is accessible to upper-income and most middle-income
households. The heavily subsidized NFIP has an average annual policy
premium of approximately $700 and delivers the most subsidy to
higher-income households, who are more likely to purchase NFIP
189. See Jesse M. Keenan, Thomas Hill & Anurag Gumber, Climate Gentrification: From
Theory to Empiricism in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 13 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Apr. 23, 2018,
1, 2–4 (explaining climate gentrification).
190. It is the opacity of incentive effects that generally solidifies the superiority of the private
insurance market for risk spreading because insurers have the motivation and resources to answer
such questions.
191. See ROSENBAUM & BOULWARE, supra note 118, at 3–4, 66.
192. See Katie Warren, Miami Could Be Underwater Within 80 Years, but Rich People Keep
Buying Luxury Waterfront Homes—and Local Experts Say There’s a Simple Explanation for It,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 10, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/miami-luxury-realestate-market-home-sales-sea-levels-underwater-2019-3 [https://perma.cc/TQJ7-XXJE].
193. The dynamic described by Kaplow, where investors eschew private insurance markets,
which are better at calibrating the balance between incentives and risk spreading, in favor of
government-funded transition relief, differs somewhat in the case of flooding. The subsidization
of public flood insurance has diminished private flood options and, unfortunately, has failed to
confer the efficiency benefits envisioned for private risk markets. See Ike Brannon & Ari Blask,
REFORMING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: TOWARD PRIVATE FLOOD
INSURANCE 1 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 871, 2017), https://www.cato.org/policyanalysis/reforming-national-flood-insurance-program-toward-private-flood-insurance [https://
perma.cc/V8ZS-HA7N] (noting that subsidized NFIP stokes moral hazard).
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insurance and receive larger payouts.194 This has led commentators to
describe the NFIP as the “government’s hidden housing subsidy for the
rich.”195 There is a small market for private flood insurance, including
supplemental insurance that covers losses in excess of the NFIP’s
$250,000 cap. Upper-income, and to a lesser degree middle-income,
homeowners also enjoy opportunities for wealth diversification
through stocks, bonds, business ownership, and other assets.
Diversification spreads risk within a household by distributing assets,
and the risk of losses, across different investments.
Because the higher-income segment of the population is more
vulnerable to incentive distortion regarding location choice and has
insurance options for risk spreading, there is not a strong efficiency or
environmental rationale for extending transition relief to this group.196
Further incentivizing location in flood zones, rather than retreat,
causes environmental harm to vulnerable flood zones and ecosystem
services, threatens human safety, and, ultimately, increases total
dispossession over time. Moreover, there is neither the political will
nor the budget to fund buyouts for all of the homeowners currently at
risk, much less for the number who will require funding in the future.197
Relying on market forces for upper-income households has additional
194. FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FACT SHEET 1 (2016),
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_NFIP_National-Flood-Insurance-ProgramFact-Sheet_May-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS3F-LJEQ] (stating average premium in 2016);
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effect of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68
STAN. L. REV. 571, 579, 602 n.121 (2016) (finding a regressive effect of flood and other climate
subsidies).
195. Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for the Rich,
POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:38 AM) https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/08/hiddensubsidy-rich-flood-insurance-000495 [https://perma.cc/F8US-3D5F].
196. Recall that compensation (i.e., transition relief) can distort incentives and is often
unnecessary if individuals can access private insurance markets for risk spreading. See supra notes
164–174. Higher-income groups have the financial means to elect to move into flood zones,
typically coastal areas, and can afford flood insurance. See Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt,
The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 291, 302
(2000) (noting statistical findings that income is positively correlated with flood insurance
purchases, corresponding with a low uptake of flood insurance by low-income households); V.
Kerry Smith, Jared C. Carbone, Jaren C. Pope, Daniel G. Hallstrom & Michael E. Darden,
Adjusting to Natural Disasters, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 37, 49 (2006) (“Our analysis suggests
higher income groups do not adjust to the damage caused by disasters and, if anything, tend to
move to coastal locations with higher risks of flooding damage.”).
197. See Miyuki Hino, Christopher B. Field & Katharine J. Mach, Managed Retreat as a
Response to Natural Hazard Risk, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 364, 364 (2017) (describing the
high cost of managed retreat and noting that by 2100, sea-level rise may displace between 72 and
187 million people).
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advantages.198 Real estate and insurance markets can respond to
dispersed and dynamic risk information with granular pricing, offering
graduated responses to flood risk.199 Of course, this assumes that
market participants bear the costs of their own risk-taking and cannot
pass them on to investors or the government. This is currently the case
for private flood insurance but not for the public NFIP.200
This Article’s proposal to curtail transition relief to upper- and
middle-income owners runs counter to the weight of current policy
opinion. Policymakers and commentators have lauded buyouts as
economically efficient.201 However, their view follows from the
comparison of public costs to largely private benefits. Specifically,
FEMA’s cost-benefit analysis compares the public costs of acquisition
against the private benefit of avoiding future flood damage to the home
and a modest per-foot measure of the value of ecosystem services from
the land’s use as open space.202 However, damage avoidance is only a
public benefit when the property is insured by the NFIP (which is not
required by most federal buyout laws), or, circularly, because of public
expenditures on disaster relief. Some commentators have argued that
buyouts are efficient because it is cheaper for the government to buy
out properties than to fund costly, and sometimes ineffective,
adaptation measures (e.g., beach renourishment, building levees,
etc.).203 It is not clear whether these claims account for the volume of

198. See Michael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt, The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A
Commodification Primer, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 731, 734, 741–42 (2019) (noting the potential
institutional efficacy of markets versus government regulators in responding to disaster risk).
199. See Pappas & Flatt, Climate Changes Property, supra note 11, at 370 (comparing marketbased, emergent retreat policies to managed retreat policies).
200. See Brannon & Blask, supra note 195. For a description of how banks produced systemic
risk because the banks and their key employees did not bear the cost of their faulty risk
assessments, see Okamoto, supra note 107, at 185–89.
201. See, e.g., Kayode O. Atoba, Samuel D. Brody, Wesley E. Highfield, Christine C. Shepard
& Lily N. Verdone, Strategic Property Buyouts To Enhance Flood Resilience: A Multi-Criteria
Spatial Approach for Incorporating Ecological Values into the Selection Process, 20 ENV’T
HAZARDS 229, 229–35 (2020) (explaining that buyouts are cost-effective in general and when
adapted to provide more environmental value); Tate et al., supra note 11, at 2055–56 (finding that
buyouts by the City of Cedar Rapids were cost-effective based on flood avoidance benefits);
Flood Information and Programs, STORMWATER MGMT. COMM’N, LAKE CNTY., ILL., https://
www.lakecountyil.gov/3973/Flood-Information-and-Programs [https://perma.cc/M7CG-8MG4]
(noting that buyouts are “one of the most cost-effective flood reduction tools”).
202. 44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5) (2022); FEMA, USING ECOSYSTEM SERVICE BENEFITS IN THE
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 2–3 (2021), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_
hma-ecosystem-service-benefits_fact-sheet_january-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN5N-DAYR].
203. See, e.g., FREUDENBERG ET AL., supra note 59, at 8, 50 (favorably comparing
buyouts to other adaptation measures that require ongoing public expenditures).
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property buyout required to address flooding, or why we should justify
buyouts based on their superior efficiency to non-cost-effective
adaptation measures.
The political challenges for means testing buyouts are more
concerning. Upper-income voters and the real estate interests that
benefit from their coastal home purchases will oppose restricting
buyout eligibility on the basis of income. One advantage of reforming
buyout law now, rather than later, is that the relatively small scale of
buyouts should lessen political pushback. Some floodplain owners are
not yet aware of this government benefit and buyouts appear less on
the political radar of real estate interests than the public flood
insurance program. As buyouts grow, as seems likely given rising
waters and opposition to strict development restrictions, it will become
more difficult politically to restrict eligibility. The current political
moment, and the growing recognition of equity as a democratic goal,
may be particularly opportune for reforming buyouts to restrict subsidy
to middle- and upper-income owners.
An alternative to eliminating buyouts for upper-income
households, and one that may be more palatable politically, is to offer
partial compensation. This will lessen, but not eliminate, incentive
distortion and buy-in to flood zones. The legal structure of buyouts
already allows for partial compensation via the cost share, which can
by paid directly by homeowners.204 The HMGP allows either the local
or state government or the homeowner to pay the required cost share,
although the implementing jurisdictions rarely impose cost-share
requirements on owners.205 Other countries have offered partial
compensation in response to floods. For example, after the flood of
2013 in the Eferding Basin, the Austrian government offered to pay
owners 80 percent of the home’s pre-2013 market value and 80 percent
of demolition costs.206 In Quebec, provincial legislation offers up to
$250,000 in compensation to those who choose to relocate and a

204. See FEMA, HOMEOWNER’S GUIDE, supra note 145.
205. Cf. FEMA, Fact Sheet: Acquisition of Property After a Flood Event, https://
www.fema.gov/news-release/20200220/fey-enfomasyon-akizisyon-pwopriyete-apre-yon-inondasyon
[https://perma.cc/46ME-6H8R], (last updated Mar. 18, 2021) (stating that the local or state
government pays the cost share).
206. Sebastian Seebauer & Claudia Winkler, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Factors in
Household Decisions for or Against Relocation from a Flood, 60 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE, no.
102,018, 2020, at 1, 3 (describing a buyout in which participants had to absorb 20 percent of their
home-investment and demolition costs).
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lifetime maximum of $100,000 to those who choose to rebuild
instead.207
Partial compensation structured as an across-the-board maximum
payment would allow low-income owners to receive complete or nearcomplete compensation in practice due to their lower home values,
while middle- and upper-income households would garner partial
compensation. For example, the government might make all flooded
households eligible for buyout compensation up to $200,000 regardless
of income. This approach appeals as a compromise that provides
everyone some benefit but allocates to needier households a
proportionally higher amount of compensation relative to home value.
However, a significant disadvantage of capped universal compensation
is that expending funds on partial compensation for upper-income
residents diverts money from lower-income ones, given the limited
pool of funding available for buyouts. Also, a partial payment to
middle- and upper-income households who have the capacity to lessen
their flood risk exposure creates an incentive for buy-in, albeit a
smaller incentive than full compensation.208 Even if we accept these
shortcomings, it is not evident that hazard mitigation grants are the
ideal mechanism or FEMA the optimal institution for calibrating the
level of partial payment that will reduce incentive effects while
maintaining risk spreading.
B. Risk Perception and Incentive Effects for Middle- and UpperIncome Owners
Assumptions about incentives and risk spreading unravel, of
course, if biases or cognitive failures prevent people from perceiving a
flood risk. If people remain unaware of flood risk, it will not affect their
behavior regardless of transition relief from the government. It seems
unlikely that there is a widespread misperception that property in
floodplains is without flood risk. If there was a universal perception of
no or minimal flood risk, real estate prices in coastal and riverine areas
would not be declining.209 Moreover, in some circumstances cognitive
207. See BRENT DOBERSTEIN, SHAIEREE COTTAR, BRITTNEY WONG, MICHELLE
ANAGNOSTOU & SHAWNA HAMILTON, INST. FOR CATASTROPHIC LOSS REDUCTION,
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED HOME BUYOUT PROGRAMS AND POST-FLOOD DECISIONS TO
RETREAT 8 (2020), https://www.iclr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ICLR-QRP-ReportDoberstein-et-al-FINAL-Jan-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8JA-ERD3].
208. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 542, 583–84.
209. See supra note 115.
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biases seem likely to exaggerate, rather than preclude, perception of
flood risk. The “availability heuristic” causes people to overestimate
probabilities based on memorable, anecdotal evidence (e.g., media
coverage, personal experience) that places an event top of mind.210
Major hurricanes and floods in the areas most at risk, such as Miami,
Houston, and New Orleans, have left few Americans unaware of flood
risk. And a growing percentage of the population has directly
experienced flooding.211
It does seem likely, however, that people underestimate the
magnitude of the risks of flooding and flood-related damage or that in
certain circumstances risk perceptions deviate more sharply from
objective flood risk (e.g., people may underestimate the risk in places
subject to slow-moving sea-level rise compared to areas that have
experienced storm flooding). This may counsel in favor of incremental
implementation of reforms to limit, or means test, buyouts. It does not,
however, provide a rationale for eschewing such reforms altogether.
Law affects risk perception and, in this Author’s view, conveys
information about the presence and severity of a risk, serving indirectly
as a form of risk communication. Laws that increase internalization of
costs not only increase financial risks but also make flood risk more
salient, or top of mind. Conversely, buyout laws decrease actual
financial risk and possibly flood risk perception.
Moreover, going forward, public awareness of flood risk and the
accuracy of residents’ risk estimations should improve due to a recent
revolution in the availability of flood risk information. The NFIP’s Risk
2.0 program now provides individualized risk estimates by address
using data gathered from LiDAR, a remote sensing laser.212 The
210. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974). There is also some evidence from a study exposing
participants to news clips and videos of future sea-level rise that individuals’ concern about sealevel rise and support for funding adaptation measures increases with rising risk. Treuer et al.,
supra note 3, at 112–16.
211. Cf. John P. Reser, Graham A. Bradley & Michelle C. Ellul, Encountering Climate
Change: “Seeing” Is More than “Believing”, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 521, 522–27 (2014)
(finding that flooding experience provided deeper and more contextualized risk awareness of
climate change and its effects). But see Lorraine Whitmarsh, Are Flood Victims More Concerned
About Climate Change than Other People? The Role of Direct Experience in Risk Perception and
Behavioural Response, 11 J. RISK RSCH. 351, 351 (2008) (finding that flooding experience did not
increase perception of climate risk).
212. FEMA, Risk Rating, supra note 29; FEMA, Federal Mapping Programs Fact Sheets
(2022), https://hazards.fema.gov/femaportal/wps/portal/!ut/p/z0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM
AfIjo8zifQI83D38vQ38LRxNXAwCnZ1DvEL9XA0N3M30C7IdFQFYsJTl/p0/IZ7_LPHGHO
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nonprofit First Street Foundation recently released a free online tool
that reveals past flood information and estimates flood risk.213 And
perhaps most impactfully, the major real estate websites Redfin and
Realtor.com have added flood ratings to their listings.214
C. Exceptions
While the default should be against transition relief for higherincome households, there should be categories of exceptions based on
efficiency and welfare concerns.215 For example, it is socially costly and
normatively undesirable for homeowners to be trapped in flood zones
that pose a high risk to human safety because they owe more than their
house is worth and cannot afford to relocate. This situation is more
likely to affect lower-income owners than higher ones. However, if a
higher-income homeowner in a severe flood zone faces a substantial
risk of death or grave injury due to financial entrapment, both welfare
considerations and morality support aid. Similarly, this Author does
not endorse refusing emergency relief or housing assistance in
situations of imminent peril.216 In these scenarios, one option is for the
government to offer more limited transition relief to middle- and
upper-income owners, such as a grant or loan to fund relocation, rather
than pay the full, preflood market value of the residence. Notably,
climate retreat usually does not confront immediate life-or-death
situations; to the contrary, buyouts typically take more than five years
to complete.217
Unforeseeable, rapid-onset flood events may also justify
exceptions. For example, rivers on occasion avulse, meaning that they
“jump” to a new course as much as several kilometers from the original

K0O0FS90QC3D3QM530I3=CZ6_LPHGHOK0O8A4D0QCCTJUNE10G6=MOA=Ejavax.po
rtlet.as!=ContentData!QCPusercareQCPguidesAndDocsQCPDocumentsQCPprogFacts.htm==
[https://perma.cc/GWR9-G4BW].
213. Flood
Factor,
FIRST
ST.
FOUND.,
https://firststreet.org/flood-factor
[https://perma.cc/6NXJ-G4TV].
214. See James Kleimann, Redfin Joins Realtor.com in Displaying Flood Data,
HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 17, 2021, 12:40 PM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/redfin-joinsrealtor-com-in-displaying-flood-data [https://perma.cc/7RBQ-NC9F].
215. Shavell’s work, as well as analyses by other theorists of pollution-control mechanisms
and fishing permits, makes the point that, in certain circumstances, transition relief increases
welfare. See Shavell, supra note 18, at 38–39; see also Nash, supra note 15, at 841–48.
216. The majority of floods do not result in high death counts. See 1 Freddy Vinet, Flood
Impacts on Loss of Human Life and Health, in FLOODS 33, 35 (Freddy Vinet ed., 2017).
217. See WEBER & MOORE, supra note 11.
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channel or reverse flow. These “earthquakes of rivers” appear to be
increasing in frequency with climate change but are still rare and
unpredictable.218 An avulsion could mean that residents who were
originally located in a flood-safe area now reside in the heart of a flood
zone. Unlike with hurricanes and storms, there is not yet a satisfactory
way to predict if a river will avulse and where it will move.219 Because
avulsions are unpredictable, incentive distortion is not an issue, and
residents may lack opportunities for risk spreading (e.g., they may have
been ineligible for federal flood insurance because they were not in a
qualifying floodplain prior to the avulsion and standard home
insurance policies do not cover flooding). Climate transition relief in
the form of buyout or other aid would be appropriate in these cases.
Long-time owners of primary homes offer another potential
category of exception based on their higher-than-average
dispossession costs.220 For example, a buyout program could
compensate owners who bought twenty-five or more years ago, prior
to public awareness of climate change. Average homeownership length
is less than half this time, with relocation more frequent in some coastal
areas.221 As a result, protection for very long-time owners is unlikely to
apply to many residents or to incentivize substantial buy-in to flood
zones.
D. Pricing Buyout Compensation into Public Flood Insurance
Buyout may also be useful when the acquired property has a
history of repeat insurance claims against the NFIP and buyout can
save the government money.222 Because the United States subsidizes

218. Chadwick et al., supra note 28, at 17,588–89; Fred Pearce, When the Levees Break, 372
SCIENCE 676, 677 (2021).
219. Despite improvement in our ability to predict avulsions, the science is still uncertain,
and human interaction with rivers and climate change stymie predictability. See Pearce, supra
note 218, at 678.
220. High dispossession costs for long-time owners occur in part because they are more likely
to be elderly. The elderly are particularly vulnerable to psychological and physical harm from
relocation. See Richard V. Burkhauser, Barbara A. Butrica & Michael J. Wasylenko, Mobility
Patterns of Older Homeowners: Are Older Homeowners Trapped in Distressed Neighborhoods?,
17 RSCH. ON AGING 363, 381 (1995).
221. See Nadia Evangelou, How Long Do Homeowners Stay in Their Homes?, NAR (Jan. 8,
2020), https://www.nar.realtor/blogs/economists-outlook/how-long-do-homeowners-stay-in-their-homes
[https://perma.cc/2N78-W5NM].
222. See Peterson et al., supra note 48, at 1 (“The attraction of buyouts is that they can
permanently remove vulnerable homes from flood hazard areas.”).
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public flood insurance, the general public bears the burden of
“repetitive loss” and “severe repetitive loss” properties, which can
generate insurance payouts in excess of property value over time.223 In
this situation, the compensation granted is not transition relief to
cushion owners from economic shock or frustrated expectations, but
rather a cost-savings measure for the government as an insurer.
One solution is to offer buyouts for high-income owners only
within the NFIP, rather than extending buyouts gratis as disaster relief.
Currently, most of the federal buyout programs do not require that
homeowners hold insurance to be eligible for buyout compensation.
The exception is the FMA buyout program, which requires that
property owners have flood insurance at the time the jurisdiction
applies to FEMA for buyout funding and prioritizes the costliest
properties to insure for buyouts (i.e., properties with the most severe
flood damage histories).224 The FMA offers a model that could be
expanded to other buyout laws and programs. Anna Weber and Rob
Moore of the Natural Resources Defense Council have proposed a
variant of insurance-based buyouts where the NFIP would include an
option, held by the government, to buy out owners when flood damage
totals more than 50 percent of the home’s fair market value.225
If a buyout option is not reflected in premiums, insurance-based
buyouts will still cause undesirable incentives for risky housing.
Optimally, the NFIP would price the cost of buyouts into premiums for
higher-income owners. As FEMA gradually phases in rate increases,226
the possibility of pricing buyouts into insurance in the future, rather
than subsidizing them, seems more hopeful. However, political
demand for subsidy may prevent risk-based pricing of a buyout option
into the NFIP. This in turn would re-create perverse incentives for
risky housing choice.
In summary, buyouts, and subsidized flood insurance, are highly
likely to distort higher-income owners’ incentives and prompt
223. See Rob Moore, Flood, Rebuild, Repeat: The Need for Flood Insurance Reforms (Aug.
11, 2016), NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/experts/rob-moore/flood-rebuildrepeat-need-flood-insurance-reforms [https://perma.cc/N9QT-22CP].
224. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c.
225. WEBER & MOORE, supra note 11, at 4, 22 n.49. This approach might be combined with
discounts for flood insurance offered in exchange for the buyout option. See Dena Adler, Michael
Burger, Rob Moore & Joel Scata, Changing the National Flood Insurance Program for a Changing
Climate, 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10,320, 10,322–23 (2019).
226. Christopher Flavelle, Climate Threats Could Mean Big Jumps in Insurance Costs this
Year, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/climate/flood-insurancefema.html [https://perma.cc/5XBC-XPX7].
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overinvestment in floodplains real estate. Accordingly, this Article
advocates limiting access to buyout compensation for this group, at
least insofar as the compensation is gratis rather than paid for via
insurance. However, as discussed next, the underpinnings of climate
transition relief, incentive distortion and risk spreading, point to a
different conclusion for low-income residents of the floodplains.
V. THE HETEROGENEOUS FLOODPLAIN: TRANSITION RELIEF FOR
THE POOR
The concentration of poor people on floodplains poses an
enormous challenge to climate retreat policy and the project of
balancing dispossession costs against incentives for safe residential
location. The disparate burden of flooding on poor communities and
the lack of affordable, flood-safe housing turns what would otherwise
be ready solutions for climate retreat, such as the assumption of risk,
capitalization of risk into real estate prices, and insurance, into
environmental justice quandaries. Low-income residents often move
into floodplains in search of affordable housing, not due to incentive
distortions from the availability of government buyouts (or flood
insurance). Not only is flood exposure high for low-income
populations, its impact on finances and personal safety is more severe
than for middle- and upper-income individuals, who have more
resources for flood insurance, repairs, and emergency evacuation.227
These differences in the operation of incentives and risk spreading for
upper-income versus lower-income residents justify selectively
extending transition relief to poorer residents via means testing.
A. Incentives Under Conditions of Choice Constraint
Choice is a prerequisite for incentives’ influence on behavior, a
neglected point in classic transition relief theory and incentive
scholarship in general. Low-income households typically have highly
constrained housing choices and often struggle to secure any housing
at all. Exclusionary zoning regulations have severely reduced housing
affordability by prohibiting dense, multifamily housing in most suburbs

227. See Craig E. Colten, Vulnerability and Place: Flat Land and Uneven Risk in New Orleans,
108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 731, 733 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25
LAW & INEQ. 297, 302–04 (2007) [hereinafter Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality] (describing
the vulnerability of poor and Black residents during Hurricane Katrina and other disasters).
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and many urban areas—not despite law, but as a matter of law.228 For
example, a study of the San Francisco Bay area found that growth
controls and moratoria in certain areas of the city increased housing
prices 17–38 percent compared to areas without restrictive
regulations.229 Compounding undersupply in the private housing
market, there is also a major shortage of subsidized housing.230 Choices
for low-income renters are so limited that the federal rental voucher
program, which gives renters payment vouchers for private apartment
rentals, is now experimenting with employing “housing navigators” to
help participants secure apartments.231
These constraints on housing choice greatly reduce the incentive
distortion and overinvestment produced by government
compensation.232 The primary force motivating low-income owners and
renters to reside in the floodplains is neither the safety net of
government compensation from buyouts nor subsidies from public
flood insurance. Instead, it is the fact that floodplains are more
affordable, in part because of their flood risk.233 Researchers observe

228. See Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1667, 1667–68, 1674–77
(2016). One challenge for climate adaptation will be to selectively increase residential density
(inclusionary zoning) in climate-safe zones. Increasing density in flood zones multiplies exposure
to flood risk and presents a troubling tradeoff. This Author thanks Heather Payne for her
comments on this point.
229. Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Controls
on Housing Prices, 30 J.L. & ECON. 149, 158 (1987). A more recent study in Manhattan found
that constraints on new housing construction doubled the cost of condominiums. Edward L.
Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing
Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 367 (2005).
230. Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., The Long Wait for a Home, 6 HOUS. SPOTLIGHT 1, 5
(2016), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/HousingSpotlight_6-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFK3Q96A].
231. Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz &
Christopher Palmer, Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to
Neighborhood Choice 13, 19–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26164, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26164 [https://perma.cc/XZ2L-QK3X].
232. Cf. Treuer et al., supra note 3, at 114–15 (explaining that, in a study that exposed 348
South Florida residents to computerized simulations of climate change over time, lower-income
participants expressed stronger intentions to move, as did upper-income participants, compared
to middle-income participants).
233. The role of floodplains in housing the poor is evident in the close similarity between
floodplain maps and maps of historic redlining (the government policy of refusing to insure
mortgages in neighborhoods populated by poor residents of color). See Lily Katz, A Racist Past,
A Flooded Future: Formerly Redlined Areas Have $107 Billion Worth of Homes Facing Flood
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that low-income households live in higher risk areas because flood risk
discounts housing prices and increases affordability.234 Climate
gentrification is further increasing the concentration of low-income
people in the most severe flood risk zones as individuals with financial
means seek higher ground, including in formerly low-income
communities of color.235
B. Concentrated Losses and Risk Spreading
Compared to their more affluent counterparts in the floodplains,
low-income residents have limited access to risk spreading to mitigate
climate losses. First, there is no insurance that covers the value of a
renter’s lost lease (i.e., the difference between rent in a flooded rental
and the market rent for a comparable rental) or permanent relocation
costs. Renters can only purchase insurance policies for property
damage, either in the private market or through the NFIP. It seems
unlikely that more comprehensive tenants’ insurance will arise, as
many tenants cannot afford to insure their personal property, much less
their lease interest. As a result, tenants lack risk-spreading options for
the costs associated with relocation.
Second, low-income owners are less likely to carry flood insurance
due to difficulty affording it.236 The overall rate of uptake for flood
insurance is low, with more than two-thirds of eligible owners lacking
insurance.237 Low-income owners are less likely to maintain flood
insurance than higher-income owners.238 This occurs despite the fact
that flood insurance is compulsory to acquire a mortgage on property
Risk—25% More Than Non-Redlined Areas, REDFIN NEWS (Mar. 14, 2021),
https://www.redfin.com/news/redlining-flood-risk [https://perma.cc/WY72-CC4H].
234. See Sarmiento & Miller, supra note 14, at 13 (“[L]ow income households live in higher
[flood] risk areas than middle income households in order to find affordable housing.”). Of
course, this is the case on average, not for every household or for Tribal communities and certain
intentional communities of color.
235. See Keenan et al., supra note 189, at 2–4.
236. Solving the underinsurance problem in low-income communities may require means
testing or vouchers for public flood insurance, proposals currently under consideration by the
executive branch. Thomas Frank, Biden Budget Includes Plan To Help Poor Buy Flood Insurance,
SCI. AM. (June 1, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biden-budget-includes-planto-help-poor-buy-flood-insurance [https://perma.cc/JFN2-GMWH].
237. Carolyn Kousky & Brett Lingle, The Three Maps that Explain Residential Flood
Insurance Purchases, WHARTON RISK MGMT. & DECISIONS PROCESSES CTR. (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/lab-notes/the-3-maps-that-explain-residential-flood-insura
nce-purchases [https://perma.cc/7DSK-QM7G].
238. See Browne & Hoyt, supra note 196.
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in a FEMA-designated Special Flood Hazard Area (“SFHA”) and the
federal government heavily subsidizes public flood insurance.239 As
William Donner and Havidán Rodriguez observe in their analysis of
population composition and disaster inequality, “Disaster-resistant
housing and affordable insurance are often beyond the financial grasp
of the poorest groups within society, placing them at greater risk.”240
Flood insurance has become so unaffordable for low-income owners
that there is debate at present about whether to means test NFIP
premiums to rectify disparate access to flood insurance.241
One could argue that the unaffordability of insurance means that
insurance is working as intended to price residents out of high-risk
areas. This is true to the extent that insurance unaffordability does
accomplish some residential movement to climate-safer locations,
albeit far less for poor households for the reasons previously discussed.
However, relying solely on affordability and market forces conflates
ability to pay with welfare. Low-income residents may be unable to
afford insurance but have significant financial investment in a
residence or a strong commitment to remain in their community. This
argument also assumes that once priced out of insurance, low-income
households can afford climate-safer housing options outside of flood
zones.
Notably, even if a lower-income owner can afford public flood
insurance, it is designed to address the risk of property damage, not
relocation. Most flood-damage payouts fall well short of a “total loss”
and thus fund repairs but not relocation.242 For those who can afford
private insurance, “value policies” exist (though are not yet common)
that guarantee a prespecified dollar payout, even if that amount
exceeds the actual damage or the fair market value of the property.
Private “value policies” enable owners who can afford these policies to
use insurance payouts to relocate.243
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a)–(b).
240. William Donner & Havidán Rodriguez, Population Composition, Migration and
Inequality: The Influence of Demographic Changes on Disaster Risk and Vulnerability, 87 SOC.
FACTORS 1089, 1091 (2008).
241. Subsidizing insurance is likely to create a degree of incentive distortion among lowincome owners to stay in climate risk zones, although as discussed in this Part, affordability is the
main driver of location in flood zones for this group.
242. Telephone Interview with NFIP (June 2021) (notes on file with author).
243. It is not clear that private value insurance will remain available to redress flooding. As
flooding costs mount, private insurers may pull out of the market. Rising storm- and fire-damage
costs are already causing insurers to decline coverage or become insolvent in some markets. See
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Not only do low-income households have less access to insurance
and other risk-spreading mechanisms, they experience higher marginal
harms from home loss because they have less wealth to begin with (i.e.,
the declining marginal utility of money). In addition, low-income
owners’ assets are highly concentrated in their home equity.244 This
amplifies losses and leaves them at higher risk of mortgage entrapment,
meaning their outstanding debt prevents them from relocating despite
dangerous declines in habitability and safety. Tenants may face even
steeper marginal costs because affordable leases are painfully scarce,
more so than lower-priced real estate inventory for purchase.245 The
loss of housing assets also imposes secondary harms because housing is
intertwined with educational opportunities, job opportunities, and
even health. Downward mobility in place-based opportunity has a
particularly deleterious effect on children, as demonstrated by Raj
Chetty’s groundbreaking work on the effect of rental vouchers on child
outcomes.246
The economic toll of climate dispossession may span generations
for low-income homeowners, particularly those of color. Home wealth
is an important source of intergenerational wealth building for Black
families and a major contributor to the black-white wealth gap.247 In
addition, there may be emotional losses for owners regardless of
income; however, these effects appear quite variable, with empirical

Thomas Frank, ‘This Is Not a Survivable Market.’ Insurance Crisis Hits Fla., CLIMATEWIRE (June
22, 2022, 6:54 AM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/this-is-not-a-survivable-market-insurancecrisis-hits-fla [https://perma.cc/K37J-5D84].
244. NICOLAS PAUL RETSINA & ERIC S. BELSKY, LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP:
EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 201 (2002) (explaining that for owners with incomes below
$20,000, home equity is 72 percent of household wealth, and for owners with incomes between
$20,000 and $49,999, home equity is 55 percent of household wealth).
245. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 1, 4–5
(2020), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_
Rental_Housing_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN9U-3CT7].
246. See Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to
Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment,
106 AM. ECON. REV. 855, 888 (2016).
247. Cf. Alexandra Killewald & Brielle Bryan, Does Your Home Make You Wealthy?, 2
RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 110, 120 (2016) (showing that annual wealth benefits from
home ownership are only 50 percent as large for Blacks and 62 percent as large for Latinos as for
whites).
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evidence showing some residents instead experience place-linked
trauma after a flood and prefer to move.248
C. The Case for Transition Relief for Low-Income Residents
High- and low-income residents differ starkly in their
opportunities for risk spreading and the effect of buyout compensation
on their incentives. Higher-income homeowners enjoy greater housing
choice, a prerequisite to distortion of location incentives, as well as
access to risk-spreading markets.249 For this group, a presumption
favoring market forces or extending transition relief only in narrow
circumstances would minimize incentive effects and reduce the
increasing flow of higher-income buyers into flood zones. Low-income
owners and renters present a different picture due to constraints on
housing choice and the likelihood of concentrated losses. The case for
transition relief is more robust for this group, as is the need to craft
transition relief that promotes climate-safer relocation.
Leaving climate retreat to market forces allocates flood risk to
low-income households with constrained housing choices and much to
lose. Localities have permitted floodplain housing development,
despite growing awareness of its environmental and safety risks.250 As
flooding worsens, falling real estate prices attract more low-income
residents to the discounted floodplains and entrap existing low-income
households.251 This is a climate version of residential real estate

248. See Julia Woodhall-Melnik & Eric P. Weissman, Living with Disaster: Exploring
Complex Decisions to Stay in or Leave Flood Prone Zones, HOUS. STUD., June 7, 2021, at 1, 17
(showing that association of homes with trauma promoted desire to move); see also Seebauer &
Winkler, supra note 206, at 9–10 (finding varying reactions post-flood, with some residents fearful
to remain in their homes).
249. See David K. Ihrke & Carol S. Faber, Geographical Mobility: 2005 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, at tbl.5, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/demo/p20-567.html [https://
perma.cc/35VF-D8P5].
250. See supra notes 97–99.
251. See de Koning & Filatova, supra note 42, at 6–7 (explaining how market forces entrap
low-income households in floodplains to their further financial detriment); Christopher Coes,
Tracy Hadden Loh & Tola Myczkowska, The Great Real Estate Reset, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec.
16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/essay/distorted-and-destabilized-housing-markets-arepushing-households-into-climate-risky-low-opportunity-communities [https://perma.cc/GVN8SWGL] (“Our current system prices some environmental risk into housing costs, so low-income
residents naturally find their way into cheaper, riskier housing.”); Pappas & Flatt, Climate
Changes Property, supra note 11, at 379 (“For instance, owners of vulnerable properties may not
be financially able to leave unless they can sell their properties, so they continue to occupy risky
properties until they can recoup some investment.”).
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“filtering,” where new market-rate housing development for upperincome households makes available the older (in this version, more
waterlogged) housing for lower-income households.252 Because floods
capitalize into real estate prices, refusing to buy out low-income
residents will likely increase their residential density in floodplains and
leave them without funds for safe relocation.
While this Article has focused thus far on efficiency justifications
for transition relief for low-income residents, distributional and
reparational rationales also support targeting climate transition relief
to low-income owners and tenants. Redistributive justice theory would
consider constraints on choice, such as exclusionary zoning and the
high costs of dispossession to low-income residents, as unequal or
inequitable distributions that society should correct.253 Climate
reparations theories, while varying in aims and methodology, would
largely support voluntary relocation assistance and housing
compensation for the climate vulnerable, though not as a complete
repair of the harm.254
D. Social Justice Pitfalls of Means Testing Buyouts
Targeting buyout funding to low-income residents reduces
regressivity and enables choice; however, it also gives rise to significant
social justice pitfalls. In some cases, low-income communities and
communities of color have opposed buyouts on equity grounds or due
to distrust rooted in past dispossessions by the government, such as

252. See RICHARD U. RATCLIFF, URBAN LAND ECONOMICS 321–23 (1949) (explaining the
classic formulation of filtering theory). Filtering as a method to improve housing supply and
quality is controversial, and this Article does not seek to enter this debate. See, e.g., William C.
Baer & Christopher B. Williamson, The Filtering of Households and Housing Units, 3 J. PLAN.
LITERATURE 127, 131–32 (1988) (reviewing criticisms of filtering theory). Rather, the point for
climate retreat is that as upper-income residents flee floodplains, there is a high risk that lowerincome households attracted by declining prices will move in.
253. For an overview of the various subtheories of distributive justice, see Serena Olsaretti,
Introduction: The Idea of Distributive Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 1, 1–13 (2018). But see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96
GEO. L.J. 1565, 1583–1602 (2008) (concluding that, in the context of addressing climate change,
distributive and corrective justice do not require the United States to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in excess of its national self-interest and in greater proportion than poor nations).
254. See Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 509, 524–34
(2009); Rebecca Buxton, Reparative Justice for Climate Refugees, 94 PHILOSOPHY 193, 200–18
(2019).
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urban renewal.255 For example, a post-Katrina proposal to buy out New
Orleans homes in low-income, predominantly Black neighborhoods
elicited protest and severe political backlash.256 In theory, buyout could
be an opportunity to revitalize low-income communities by adding
open space and creating safer housing; however, past appropriations of
low-income homes and neighborhoods by the government have rarely
produced these benefits.257
The application of cost-benefit analysis to buyouts raises the
concern that low-income households, who generally rent or own lowervalue homes, will be the most cost-effective targets for climate retreat.
Specifically, high-income communities may disproportionately benefit
from the construction of levees, elevated infrastructure, or other
adaptations that allow them to remain in place, while low-income
communities will be subject to buyouts. This could also result in higherincome households receiving larger amounts of financial subsidy via
adaptation grants than lower-income ones do from buyouts. These
potential disparities are serious concerns. However, they should be
addressed by environmental justice regulation, civil rights law, and
advocacy, not by extending buyout subsidies to upper-income
homeowners. Additionally, scholars have noted that low-income
residents may be forced out to create buffer zones for the benefit of the
remaining, higher-income owners.258 Notably, the statutory
requirement that owners must voluntarily agree to buyouts counteracts
this risk, as does the prevalence of residential segregation by income.
255. For example, in the historic Black neighborhood of Kashmere Gardens in Houston,
buyouts were controversial, and residents at one point rejected a buyout. See Kevin A. Lynn, Who
Defines ‘Whole’: An Urban Political Ecology of Flood Control and Community Relocation in
Houston, Texas, 24 J. POL. ECOL. 951, 957 (2017).
256. See Juliette Landphair, “The Forgotten People of New Orleans”: Community,
Vulnerability, and the Lower Ninth Ward, 94 J. AM. HIST. 837, 844 (2007); Siders, supra note 39,
at 250 (describing the backlash to the buyout plan as “immediate and severe”). Notably, residents
of high-income communities, including Del Mar and other coastal towns in California, have
vigorously opposed managed retreat of private homes and advocated for publicly funded
armoring and sandbagging instead, largely on the basis of loss of their oceanside residences and
their ability to pass down those homes to their children. See Bragg et al., supra note 154.
257. For example, governments could use buyouts to invest in low-income communities,
rather than dispossess them, by buying flood-prone parcels and creating parks and green space in
conjunction with flood-safe affordable housing. See Caroline M. Kraan, Miyuki Hino, Jennifer
Niemann, A.R. Siders & Katharine J. Mach, Promoting Equity in Retreat Through Voluntary
Property Buyout Programs, 11 J. ENV’T STUD. & SCI. 481, 487 (2021).
258. Cf. Mach & Siders, supra note 9, at 1297 (“To identify a place where retreat will or
‘should’ occur purely on the basis of exposure to hazards or economic efficiency is to erase the
lived experiences and factors central to relocation.”).
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Resident opposition may also derive from the inability of buyouts
to compensate for noneconomic values, such as the value of
neighborhood ties or other personal attachments to place.259 Strong
place and community attachments, while not ubiquitous, affect some
residents.260 For low-income individuals, who on average occupy homes
of lesser financial value, personal and community attachments likely
comprise a relatively higher proportion of the total subjective value of
the residence to the resident compared to higher-income individuals.
There may be absolute differences in residential attachment as well.
Low-income residents tend to rely more heavily on neighbors and
nearby family for help, such as childcare, favors, and short-term loans,
than their higher-income counterparts.261 These support networks
require time and familiarity and cannot be readily duplicated when
residents disperse to new locations. The noneconomic value of home
loss supports increased experimentation with whole community
relocation, more limited co-relocation of community members by
offering subsidized housing, or linking modest amounts of incentive
compensation to longevity of residence (rather than the current
practice of paying bonuses to residents for relocating in the same
county).262
259. For example, residents of the Ninth Ward in New Orleans have exceptionally robust
community attachments and a long history of sheltering Black residents. See Landphair, supra
note 256, at 839–42. Although this Article does not directly address historic, intentional, and
Tribal communities, these communities, as well as individuals in other communities who have
atypically strong community attachments, raise hard questions for climate retreat.
260. Some climate retreat research has not found strong evidence of place attachment. For
example, a survey of working-class and middle-class residents in communities affected by
Hurricane Sandy found that loss of friends, neighbors, and families from the community was the
least important concern of residents in their relocation decision-making. Bukvic & Owen, supra
note 21, at 110, 113.
261. See Miranda J. Lubbers, Mario Luis Small & Hugo Valenzuela García, Do Networks
Help People To Manage Poverty? Perspectives from the Field, 689 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 7, 10–13, 15–17 (2020). Sociologists have noted that while low-income people rely on
family, friends, and neighborhoods, “network poverty” can occur when the members of one’s
network lack financial resources, connections to opportunities, or certain types of information.
See id. at 12–15.
262. For an interesting proposal for whole-community relocation, see Jessica Owley, ClimateInduced Human Displacement and Conservation Lands, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 670–85 (2021).
With respect to government compensation, Thomas Merrill has suggested the government pay a
1 percent bonus above fair market value for each year of residence in a home when the
government takes property under eminent domain. The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of
Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing Before the S. Jud. Comm., 109th Cong. 122 (2005)
(statement of Thomas W. Merrill, Professor, Columbia Law School). In low-income communities,
particularly among renters, residential tenure is typically shorter, so residence in a neighborhood
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All of these concerns underscore the role of environmental justice
in climate retreat and the importance of ensuring that buyouts remain
voluntary.263 However, the goal of equity does not support an incomeneutral approach to buyouts or legal rules prohibiting buyouts.
Voluntary buyouts provide low-income owners an option they might
otherwise lack.264 Communities, and individuals within communities,
differ in their preferences for buyout versus rebuilding in place and
should have a meaningful choice. In addition, as water levels rise,
compensation for climate retreat is likely to become increasingly
valuable and sought after by homeowners. Societal views of what
constitutes an equitable and desirable solution will shift with escalating
flood frequency and severity. Even now, buyout applications
outnumber funding dollars, suggesting significant demand for
government funds.265 Without means testing, it seems likely that the
opposite social justice concern will arise that upper- and middle-

or census tract may be the better measure. With respect to eminent domain in response to
residential flooding, Katie Sinclair has suggested enhanced compensation and a sliding scale of
compensation based on income. Katie Sinclair, Water, Water Everywhere, Communities on the
Brink: Retreat as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy in the Face of Floods, Hurricanes, and
Rising Seas, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259, 303–05 (2019).
263. Cf. A.R. Siders, Miyuki Hino & Katharine J. Mach, The Case for Strategic and Managed
Climate Retreat: Why, Where, When, and How Should Communities Relocate?, 365 SCIENCE 761,
761 (2019) (noting that retreat has “focused overwhelmingly on physical removal of people and
buildings, with limited discussion of the social, cultural, psychological, or long-term economic
consequences”). In addition to the unique concerns of low-income residents, forced retreat is
“heavy-handed and politically contentious” in most communities and requires the government to
pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Mark P. Nevitt, Climate
Adaptation Strategies: How Do We Manage Managed Retreat 5 (Univ. of Penn. Working
Paper, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3681454 [https://perma.cc/
YD2B-3KQQ]. Questions remain about what constitutes voluntary acceptance of a buyout. When
financial need forces buyout because residents cannot afford flood repairs or reconstruction, there
is debate about whether relocation is truly voluntary. See Mach & Siders, supra note 9, at 1297
(“Voluntariness of retreat is often assumed to maximize benefits and minimize losses, but
empirical work is needed to explore exactly what voluntariness entails.”).
264. There appears to be psychological value to the option of buyout. A study of buyouts
following Hurricane Sandy found that individuals who relocated were less likely to report
worsened stress than those who lived in neighborhoods where there was not an organized buyout
and rebuild in place. See Liz Koslov, Alexis Merdjanoff, Elana Sulakshana & Eric Klinenberg,
When Rebuilding No Longer Means Recovery: The Stress of Staying Put After Hurricane Sandy,
165 CLIMATIC CHANGE 59, 59 (2021).
265. See supra notes 124–125 (describing the infeasibility of scaling up buyout funding to
cover all affected residential property).
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income (and in practice whiter) households will disproportionately
access and benefit from buyouts.266
E. Lessons from the Low-Income Floodplain for Legal Theory
Thus far, this Article has examined how classic transition relief
theory can inform federal buyouts in the floodplains. In a final note,
this Section briefly considers how floodplains can inform transition
relief theory. Classic transition relief theory usefully exposits the
incentive problems compensation causes. However, the assumptions
transition relief theory proceeds from, such as unconstrained
incentives, functioning insurance markets, and sufficient wealth to
purchase insurance, do not always apply.267 As a result, classic
transition relief theory helpfully illuminates the efficiency pitfalls of
compensation for property owners with means but founders in its
application to low-income floodplains.
The low-income floodplain offers a cautionary tale about
generalizing across different populations and reveals how factors such
as income inequality, discrimination, and law affect the application of
models in practice. Kwame Anthony Appiah has described how
humans construct models that serve as useful platforms for cognition,
not because they accurately depict all aspects of realities but because
they create an edifice for comparison and means of understanding our
actual beliefs.268 In this way, idealized models improve our ability to see
and incorporate the imperfections of reality.269 The classic model of
transition relief exposited by Kaplow and others serves a similar
function and illuminates the complexities of climate transition relief on
heterogeneous floodplains.
In the low-income floodplains, severely choice-constrained
housing markets mute the incentive effect from buyout compensation

266. In addition to income, there are racial dimensions to buyout access that require further
research. A recent study by James R. Elliott, Phylicia Lee Brown, and Kevin Loughran found that
whiter neighborhoods within whiter central counties had greater access to federal buyouts, but
homeowners in neighborhoods of color located in these counties were most likely to accept
buyouts when offered. See Elliott et al., supra note 14, at 12.
267. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 597 (noting an inverse relationship between risk aversion
and income but concluding that special exceptions should not be made for low-income people
because “patterns of ownership might be distorted if compensation or other mitigation were made
a function of some observable characteristic of owners of the affected assets”).
268. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, AS IF: IDEALIZATION AND IDEALS 101, 126–27 (2017).
269. See id. at 126–30.
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and enhance the loss from uncompensated flooding, both in terms of
primary risk-bearing and secondary welfare effects. Moreover, in some
cases, such as housing, the limits on choice flow substantially from prior
government action (e.g., anticompetitive zoning laws, exclusion of
persons of color from communities via racially restrictive covenants,
and historic redlining that denied FHA loans in communities of
color).270 For low-income residents of floodplains, the solution is not to
remove the option of transition relief, but to adapt it. In addition,
because classic transition relief theory addresses only the question of
compensation for investors, it omits nonowners (i.e., tenants) and the
need to reallocate initial entitlements in some circumstances, points
that Part VI.B discusses.
VI. IMPLEMENTING BUYOUTS AS CLIMATE TRANSITION RELIEF
This Part explores how to translate a reconceptualized view of
buyouts as climate transition relief into law. Compared to current
federal buyout laws, climate transition relief both narrows eligibility
and widens the type of available relief. This Part first discusses how to
limit buyouts based on income and highlights possibilities for state or
local action in the event of continued federal government inaction on
means testing. The Article offers initial thoughts, not fully delineated
legislative proposals, in part because state or local reforms could
productively differ based on regional flood patterns, populations, and
culture. Second, Part VI.B advocates extending climate transition
relief to tenants and considers ways to implement this change. Last,
Part VI.C proposes reforms to improve climate retreat from buyouts
and ensure that residents in fact relocate to flood- and climate-safe
housing.
A. Restructuring Buyout Eligibility
An important, and controversial, recommendation of this Article
is to curtail residential buyouts as a climate retreat strategy.
Specifically, as discussed in Part IV, climate retreat policy should
eschew transition relief (i.e., buyout) as the default for upper- and
middle-income homeowners, who are able to avoid flood losses or to
pay for buyouts as optional coverage within public flood insurance.
Instead, the federal government should allocate buyout funds to lowerincome residents of floodplains, who experience less incentive

270.

See supra notes 228–230 and accompanying text.
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distortion and more concentrated harms from home loss. Notably,
limiting buyouts already exists within the Stafford Act, although not on
the basis of income. Because FEMA distributes funding in response to
local application and lacks funding to make buyouts universally
available, only a fraction of homes currently benefit. In addition, a
federal regulation caps federal disaster funding to a percentage of the
estimated grant relief needed by the state.271
There are multiple ways to target buyout transition relief to lowincome floodplains residents. Most directly, buyout laws could means
test eligibility based on household income, with the federal agencies
determining income cutoffs or tiers for eligibility. Another alternative
is to base means testing on preflood home value. However, this
approach could encourage investors to strategically purchase lowvalue homes in flood zones and would overfund individuals with lowvalue homes but significant wealth. Another approach is to adopt
universal compensation for buyouts with stringent caps on the
maximum amount paid out, as the NFIP does for building damage
payouts. Lower-income residents in practice would receive full or nearfull compensation for their modest-value homes. Higher-income
residents would receive the same sum of money, but it would amount
to only partial compensation of their pricier homes. Capped
compensation is cheaper to administer than means testing and has
broader political appeal, but it would allocate money to higher-income
citizens at the expense of low-income ones.
There are also indirect forms of means testing, whose primary
advantage may be their political palatability. One alternative, adopted
by the city of Houston, is to fund buyouts only for riverine properties.272
Proximity to the ocean versus wetlands or river floodplains is a rough
proxy for owner wealth, with a higher concentration of affluent
residents in coastal areas. However, this approach can be over- and
underinclusive, excluding some low-income communities in coastal
areas and funding middle- or higher-value properties in riverine areas.

271. 44 C.F.R. § 206.432(b)(1) (2022). The federal government may fund 15 percent of the
first $2 billion or less in estimated grant relief and then a smaller percentage for amounts
exceeding $2 billion. Id. A slightly higher funding percentage is available to states that have
developed comprehensive mitigation plans and demonstrated sound use of past mitigation
funding. 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.432(b)(2), 201.5.
272. See Active Buyout Projects, HARRIS CNTY. FLOOD DIST. (Oct. 2021), https://
www.hcfcd.org/Portals/62/Home-Buyout-Program/HCFCD%20Active%20Buyout%20Projects.pdf
[https://perma.cc/98PH-VSTC].
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In tandem with restricting eligibility based on income, the HMGP
and other FEMA buyout programs could substantially reduce, or
eliminate, the 25 percent cost-share requirement when the locality buys
out low-income owners. This legislative revision would avoid the
circuitous practice of the state or locality securing federal CDBG and
CDBG-DR funds to pay the 25 percent cost share for acquisitions.
Institutionally, we might shift buyout responsibility to the HUD
CDBG and CDBG-DR programs, as federal law already requires that
these funds mostly benefit low- or moderate-income individuals.
However, FEMA’s superior expertise at hazard mitigation and
enforcement of local NFIP regulations casts doubt on such a move.273
With respect to compensation, the amount that low-income
owners receive could reflect the value of a comparable, flood-safe
residence or the preflood market value of their acquired residence
(Part VI.B discusses tenant compensation). It is possible that the
government will be able to afford only partial compensation as
flooding intensifies and an increasing number of low-income
households move into the floodplains.274 Providing partial climate
transition relief for a greater number of low-income residents may be
distributionally preferable to full compensation of a small number.
Uncertainty about the long-term availability of funds for buyouts at
full, preflood fair market value underscores an additional benefit of
reframing buyouts—and resident expectations—from dispossession
compensation to climate transition relief.
A potential cost of means testing buyouts is that it may cause less
environmentally beneficial selection of buyout properties.275 Clustering
buyouts to create contiguous, well-situated blocks of open space can
buffer against flooding, provide ecosystem services such as water
filtration or carbon absorption, and reduce local maintenance costs for
open space. Because it is difficult to convince homeowners to accept
buyouts, “checkerboard” patterns of home buyouts are common under
the current system of universal eligibility.276 As a result, limiting
buyouts based on income may not substantially decrease
273. We could also reform buyouts to allow residents to apply directly to the federal or state
government for transition relief, rather than making funding contingent on application by their
local government, a point I explore in future work. Stephanie M. Stern, Climate Adaptation:
Mechanisms for Local Self-Determination 1–3 (Aug. 4, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
274. See supra notes 251–252 and accompanying text.
275. Atoba et al., supra note 201, at 229.
276. Id.
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environmental benefits from the current baseline. Also, because
housing developments are often economically homogeneous, and lowincome people tend to live in the riskiest locations for riverine flooding,
means-tested buyouts may provide sufficient opportunity to create
contiguous open spaces. If that does not occur, it is possible to use
eminent domain (i.e., government expropriation of flooded land with
just compensation paid to owners) instead of voluntary buyouts to
design ecologically based floodplains in the path of severe flooding, as
the Dutch currently do in their “Room for the River” flood control
program.277
To implement an income-differentiated approach, the federal
government could amend the HMGP, or, alternatively, states and
localities could adopt income requirements within the scope of their
implementation powers. Because states and localities typically
implement buyouts, they can impose their own limits within the
cooperative federalism structure of buyout statutes, so long as they do
not contravene federal statutes or regulations (e.g., a locality could not
adopt an ordinance allowing redevelopment of land acquired with
HMGP funds). States and localities could enact rules limiting buyouts
to low-income residents or requiring a minimum percentage of lowincome homeowners in each buyout. Because the major federal buyout
laws require a cost share, this could easily be accomplished without
raising preemption concerns by legislating that any buyout using state
or local funds must use means testing or benefit a specified percentage
of lower-income individuals.
There is much to be said about the comparative competence of
federal, state, and local governments to legislate and implement
climate transition relief. This Section has focused on the point that
different levels of government can differentiate buyouts by income and
leaves to future work the complex question of which level of
government should bear primary responsibility for climate transition
relief.
B. Beyond Compensation for Owned Assets: Tenants and Subsidies
Classic transition relief theory, as exposited by Graetz, Kaplow,
and other scholars, addresses the problem of legal changes from the
standpoint of investors.278 Thus, transition relief theory takes baseline

277.
278.

See supra note 35.
See supra note 15.
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entitlements as it finds them, prior to the change in question, and
considers whether relief is desirable. By focusing on compensation and
ownership, the possibility of reallocating initial entitlements falls off.
This is not a condemnation of classic transition relief theory but rather
an observation that it addresses the specific question of relief for
owner-investors. This Section considers circumstances where we might
expand climate transition relief beyond asset compensation, such as to
relocate tenants and subsidize residential adaptation.
Because climate change, and the need to retreat from flooding,
affect tenants as well as owners, either buyout compensation or similar
relief should be available to tenants. One-third of all housing units on
floodplains are renter-occupied.279 Because renters have less wealth
than homeowners, they have fewer resources to evacuate in
emergencies or to replace lost possessions.280 Yet, renter households
receive far less government aid, in part because they are ineligible for
the generous buyout compensation afforded to some of their
homeowning counterparts.281 This disparity has racial, as well as
socioeconomic, dimensions. Redlining, legally enforced segregation,
and housing market discrimination have restricted homeownership
opportunities for people of color, who now comprise a
disproportionate share of renters.282
A major deficit of buyout laws, such as the HMGP, is that they do
not compensate for leasehold interests. Instead, the Uniform
Relocation Act (“URA”), which provides compensation and
assistance for residents displaced by federal actions, applies to
tenants.283 The URA pays tenants’ relocation costs plus the difference
between their current rental and market rental rates for a comparable
dwelling, subject to a cap of $7200 over a forty-two month period of

279. NYU FURMAN CTR., HOUSING, supra note 41, at 4.
280. See Colten, supra note 227 (describing how many impoverished residents of New
Orleans lacked private automobiles to escape during Hurricane Katrina); see also Farber, Disaster
Law and Inequality, supra note 227, at 305 (noting that the poor struggle to recover postdisaster
in part because they are less likely to be homeowners and so lack home insurance and special
government benefits for homeowners).
281. See Dundon & Camp, supra note 137, at 422–24 (discussing a study that found a smaller
percentage of financial assistance flows to renters than to owners); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD.
AT HARV. UNIV., supra note 139 (describing 2019 HUD analysis of Community Development
Block Grant-Disaster Recovery finding that from 2006 to 2015 only $3.05 billion went to rental
relief compared to $13.6 billion for homeowner compensation).
282. Dundon & Camp, supra note 137, at 426.
283. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4638.
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assistance.284 This amount pales beside the hundreds of thousands of
dollars that owners receive in buyouts. Moreover, it systematically
undercompensates tenants for their leasehold interest. In a buyout, the
tenant has lost a right they bargained for in the lease—the legal right
to exit at the time specified in the lease. Many tenants also invest in
repairing or improving their rentals and cannot recoup those losses.
Undercompensation frustrates climate-safe relocation by making it
unaffordable for tenants to relocate to flood-safe zones.
There are a variety of ways to improve transition relief for lowincome tenants, either within the URA or by expanding buyout laws
to encompass tenants. Within the URA, regulation might substantially
increase the total payment cap or offer additional URA
reimbursement if the tenant signs a lease for a rental outside of a
floodplain. Within disaster law, the government could amend buyout
statutes to allow acquisition of tenants’ leasehold interests using
disaster relief funds. Valuation of the leasehold interest for buyout
could be the difference between current and market rent plus the loss
of the value of the full lease term and any investments made in the
rental (e.g., repairs, improvements). Alternatively, we might
compensate for the leasehold interest as a percentage of the value of
the fee simple. A similar approach, the deductive percentage method,
is sometimes used to value easements for eminent domain
compensation when other valuation methods would undercompensate
easement holders.285 In-kind compensation is also an interesting
possibility, one that might better make displaced tenants whole. For
example, we could prioritize low-income, flood-displaced tenants for
federal or state rental vouchers or other housing subsidies that would
otherwise not be readily obtainable due to housing assistance scarcity.
In addition to transition relief for renters, there is also a role for
subsidy to redress situations where low-income owners may have no
choice but to accept a buyout because they cannot afford to comply
with the NFIP regulations for reconstruction.286 If flood damage to a

284. Id. § 4624; 49 C.F.R. § 24.402(a) (2022).
285. See Ronald L. Baird, Easement Condemnation and State v. Doyle: Fair Market Value
Without a Market, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 199, 212 (1989) (“Some appraisers will simply state an
opinion that the value of the fee interest has been diminished by a given percentage . . . [which] is
then multiplied by the value of the fee interest in the land affected by the easement to produce
just compensation.”).
286. Scholars note the potential for the substantial damage rule to coerce unwilling residents
who cannot afford repairs to accept buyouts. See Daniel H. De Vries & James C. Fraser,
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home is greater than or equal to 50 percent of the structure’s value, the
owner must typically elevate their residence to meet locally adopted
NFIP regulations governing flood-safe reconstruction.287 Not only are
lower-priced homes more vulnerable to a substantial damage
designation (i.e., the same amount of damage is proportionally higher
for lower-value homes), lower-income owners are less able to afford
the necessary elevation and alteration requirements.288 As a result,
these households may be coerced, de facto, into accepting buyouts
because they lack the funds for reconstruction.289
One solution is to offer the option for a reconstruction grant to
low-income owners invited to participate in a local buyout, when home
elevation would provide a necessary margin of flood safety. Under the
current compensation model of buyouts, this type of subsidy is not
typically available to homeowners within a buyout (although other
provisions of the HMGP provide a limited amount of elevation funding
and owners with NFIP can purchase additional insurance coverage for
reconstruction).290 Increasing funding for low-income owners to
comply with reconstruction requirements, either as part of buyouts or
elsewhere in hazard mitigation funding, would better effectuate the
current legislative mandate that buyouts be voluntary. Such subsidies
would also provide graduated options for adaptation versus retreat that
are based on flood severity, rather than income.

Citizenship Rights and Voluntary Decision Making in Post-Disaster U.S. Floodplain Buyout
Mitigation Programs, 30 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 1, 16–17 (2012) (discussing
interviews with officials who described substantial damage rules as means to get lower-income
families off the floodplains); Siders, supra note 39, at 249 (“Homeowners unable to afford
modifications may find themselves feeling coerced to accept ‘voluntary’ buyouts due to financial
constraints.”).
287. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c), (e) (2022) (describing rebuilding requirements); § 59.1 (2022)
(defining “substantial damage” and “substantial improvement”).
288. See De Vries & Fraser, supra note 286, at 4, 17 (2012) (describing feelings of coercion
and reports of local bias in declaring low-income homes substantially damaged and thus subject
to strict reconstruction rules).
289. See Sherri Brokopp Binder & Alex Greer, The Devil Is in the Details: Linking Home
Buyout Policy, Practice, and Experience After Hurricane Sandy, 4 POL. & GOVERNANCE 97, 102
(2016) (“For homeowners with limited financial means, the implications of [the reconstruction
requirements following a substantial damage declaration] are not dissimilar to that of forced
relocation.”).
290. See 44 C.F.R. § 61 app. III.D (2021) (providing increased-cost-of-compliance coverage);
FEMA, Elevation Grants Make Multiple Homes Safer (2021), https://www.fema.gov/casestudy/elevation-grants-make-multiple-homes-safer [https://perma.cc/TYB3-U9AT].
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C. True Retreat: Incentives for Climate-Safe Relocation Post-Buyout
When the government offers climate transition relief for flood
hazard, that funding should effectuate retreat to higher ground.
Attention to relocation outcomes, meaning the flood safety of
replacement housing, is conspicuously missing from dispossessionfocused buyout laws. In a reconceptualized model of buyouts as climate
transition relief, ensuring that residents actually transition to climatesafer housing is a principal concern.
Reforming buyout laws to promote flood-safe relocation could
take a variety of forms, ranging from housing assistance to legal
mandates. Least objectionably, the government could offer
compensation bonuses for residents who relocate to flood-safe
locations or, more broadly, low-climate-risk locations (including risks
from wildfires, extreme heat, and drought). Another possibility is to
offer tiered incentive payments with the largest bonuses allocated to
households that relocate to the most climate-safe areas. Incentive
payments are a familiar tool in buyouts but typically reward residents
for relocating within the same county or promptly agreeing to a
buyout.291 Providing incentives for climate-safe, rather than proximate
or speedy, relocation supports actual climate retreat.292 Because
localities implementing buyouts prefer to retain residents and tax
revenues, the federal government may need to mandate that localities
offer incentives for flood-safe relocation as a condition of funding
buyout or offer incentive payments directly to participating residents.
Another uncontentious option is to reduce the transaction costs of
securing flood-safe housing.293 Recently, a federal pilot program
employed “housing navigators” to assist rental voucher recipients with
apartment searches and negotiations with landlords and provided

291. See id. at 100 (discussing New York City’s use of financial incentives to encourage
participation in the buyout in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy).
292. Federal buyout programs could also augment buyout incentives for safe relocation by
coordinating with climate-safer states and cities that offer tax breaks or incentive payments for
workers who relocate, as some locations have done to spur growth. For a review of state and city
incentive programs designed to attract remote workers and tech workers, see generally Stephanie
M. Stern, Untransit: Remote Work and the Transformation of Zoning, 33 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
79 (2022).
293. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 231, at 13, 19–29 (finding that housing navigators
increased moves to socioeconomically mobile neighborhoods for households with federal rental
vouchers).
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funds for security deposits and application fees when needed.294 The
housing navigators and other assistance increased placement in
neighborhoods with high socioeconomic mobility more than
threefold.295 In flood buyouts, housing search assistance has historically
been limited in scope and services. An intensive housing assistance
approach, like the navigator program, could facilitate moves to
climate-safe housing following buyout.
More controversially, the government could adopt robust
disincentives for relocation to flood zones post-buyout. For example, it
could prohibit future buyouts and other federal disaster aid for
recipients who use buyout funds to relocate to another flood zone.
Similarly, Congress could make buyout recipients ineligible for federal
flood insurance, as well as buyout, in the future if they relocate to an
area deemed a flood risk under FEMA’s rating system.
Most restrictively, the government might make compensation
contingent on the recipient’s agreement to move to a residence outside
the floodplain. This approach would be vulnerable to challenge under
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which prohibits the
government from conditioning a benefit on the recipient’s agreement
to forgo a constitutional right (e.g., associational rights), and as a
violation of equal protection.296 Its constitutionality would likely
depend on the restrictiveness of the relocation mandate, the degree of
danger posed by flooding, and the amount of choice retained by the
buyout recipient. Even if a relocation mandate passed constitutional
muster, however, high enforcement costs and friction would hinder
implementation. In buyouts, there is frequently a delay between
residents’ departure from the acquired property and permanent
resettlement, during which flooded households utilize interim housing
or short-term rentals. This makes legal requirements for relocation
difficult to track and easy to evade. On balance, voluntary approaches,
such as incentives and housing search assistance, appear to be more
promising options for reform because relocation mandates are legally
and politically fraught and difficult to enforce.

294. Id. at 13.
295. See id. (reporting only 15 percent in the control group rented in upwardly mobile
communities versus 53 percent in the group assigned to navigators).
296. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests . . . .”).

STERN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/16/2022 11:53 AM

CLIMATE TRANSITION RELIEF

233

In summary, climate transition relief in flood zones (i.e., buyouts)
should target low-income residents through means testing, provide
relief and funding for renters as well as owners, and produce flood-safe
relocation following buyout. Some of these reforms, such as means
testing, could be implemented at the local or state level or by the
federal government. Ideally, reform and implementation will occur
cooperatively at multiple levels of government. The framing of buyouts
as climate transition relief guides the buyout reforms this Part has
discussed and provides a model for government and nongovernment
actors to implement climate transition and retreat policies.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a model of climate transition relief for
federal buyouts of flooded property, as well as other forms of climate
change compensation and retreat. Currently, buyout laws operate
within a disaster frame that subordinates the goal of shifting residential
settlement to the immediate demand for individual compensation. This
Article reconceptualizes buyouts as climate transition relief that
addresses individual losses but simultaneously increases incentives for
risk-taking and overinvestment. This Article advocates means testing
buyouts to balance these competing concerns, as well as extending
buyout or similar climate transition relief to tenants. Beyond federal
buyouts, climate transition relief’s lodestars of incentives, risk
spreading, and social and market context can guide reforms in areas
such as mortgage lending in flood zones, hazard insurance, and
floodplain zoning and development.

